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**F.O.  
371**

**1948**

PALESTINE

FILE No. .... 1078 .....

..... k pp 479i .....

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
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Reference:-  
**FO 371 / 68648**

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**68648**

(10)

1548

PALESTINE  
EASTERN

E1048 /G 2

E1048 / 1048M

31/6

U. S. attitude to Palestine  
situation

F.O. Minute  
Mr McNeil

Dated 30 Jan

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

References.

68648

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

Next Paper.

773.71/2

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25 JAN 1948

E      *enter 9<sup>3</sup>*  
E1078

**SECRETARY OF STATE**

26 JAN 1948

Dick Stokes asked to see me. He told me that he had been invited to dinner by a man called Hoskins, who apparently was adviser to the Middle East Section of the State Department, but is now employed in some executive post with one of the American oil concerns. Jamali, who is apparently a close friend of Hoskins, was also present.

Dick Stokes said that the point of the dinner was that Hoskins said to him that the State Department were now very disturbed about the Palestine situation and that he, Hoskins believed that they were now hatching a new idea, with the consent of the White House, which amounted to this. They, the State Department, would tell the Jews that they had changed their mind about partition and we would be asked to remain in Palestine until after November to maintain the status quo, and then the situation would be reconsidered.

Dick Stokes told Hoskins that this was an Alice in Wonderland dream. He said that if the State Department were now prepared to admit publicly that they had been wrong and withdraw their support for partition, then it might be that His Majesty's Government would also reconsider their position. He promised, however, that he would personally and informally pass on the information to you.

Stokes did not seem quite clear as to what Jamali's reaction was. But he said that he did not think that Hoskins would have put the idea with Jamali present unless Jamali had agreed to such procedure.

/I

Copies to:  
Sir O. Sargent  
- Eastern Dept.

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I of course told Stokes that this was just another instance of American irresponsibility, but that I hardly thought that even the State Department could be so irresponsible as to believe that any Government would take an unsecured promise of this kind because plainly the State Department could give no indication of who was going to win the election and what the policy would be of the other side. I promised, however, that I would pass on the message to you.

(Sd) HECTOR McNEIL

January 20th 1948.

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1948

E

E 1238

5

PALESTINE

28 JAN '48

Registry Number E 1238/1078/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

Lord Gurney

Washington

422

27 Jan

28

*U.S. Political Policy*  
*Approved on 11/21/47*  
*... which appeared in the New York Times 27 Jan*  
*... stated that a memorandum on developing*  
*... and US behind ...*  
*... policy of all questions relating*  
*... political*  
*... in the*

Last Paper.

1078

(Minutes.)

*N.A. Dept. (Chad) 31*

*253 297*

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

*J.L.H. 2/2*

*[Signature]*

Next Paper.

1246

30471 F.O.P

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En Clair

DEPARTMENTAL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel  
No. 422

D. 5.27 p.m. 27th January 1948. 28 JAN 1948

27th January 1948. R. 10.50 p.m. 27th January 1948.

Repeated to U.K. Del. New York

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 422 of 27th January, repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

My immediately preceding telegram.

An article by James Reston about Palestine appeared in the New York Times on 27th January in which it was stated that a movement was developing inside the State Department and United States Cabinet to extend bi-partisan foreign policy to all questions relating to Palestine and thus to prevent domestic political factors from influencing future United States decisions on the subject.

2. Reston listed three factors as giving impetus to this movement. First the conviction widely held in the State and Defense Departments that President Truman's decision to support the partition of Palestine was influenced by the political strength of pre-Zionist organisations in key political areas.

Secondly the growing concern which was particularly strong in the Service Departments about United States oil resources in Near and Middle Eastern areas which were dominated by the Arab States and close to the Soviet Union (in this connexion Reston quoted the evidence given last week to the House Armed Services Subcommittee by the Secretary of Defense about what he called a strategic oil shortage, in which he touched upon the importance of oil for the European Recovery Programme).

Thirdly the effort of pre-Zionists to induce the Government to send United States troops to Palestine to assist in implementing partition.

3. But Reston believed that the main consideration in the minds of those supporting the movement was the feeling that, unless an understanding was reached between the two major political parties on this question, especially in a Presidential campaign year, there would be constant political pressure on the Government to keep pressing for partition and to support the Palestine

Government

28 JAN 1948  
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LONDON

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Government when the latter wanted political intervention. In the last part of the document it is stated that the State was concerned in order to bring to the support in the United States for any of the political parties and might attempt to utilize the political support of prominent organizations in the United States to gain that assistance.

4. But Rosten added that there seemed to be little evidence of a movement within the Government to withdraw United States support of partition. But consideration was being given in the State and Defense Department to the provision of a "small power" force to implement partition, so that United States relations with the Arab States might be disturbed as little as possible.

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1948

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E 124

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PALESTINE

JAN 1948

Registry Number

E1246/1078/31

TELEGRAM FROM

Lord Smurthwaite

No.

Washington

Dated

11 21

Received in Registry

28 Jan

28 -

US Palestine Policy

Report follow letter 52/42/48 (E1233/4/21)  
concerns collaboration with U.S. govt on  
Political Questions and general situation  
Palestine and future U.S. Policy.

Last Paper.

1238

(Minutes.)

Tel. sent.

References.

H73 311  
11

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel. W. Jan 1267  
Rpt. U.K. Ref 436  
Jan 31.

(Action completed.)

J. C. 3/2

(Index.)

1/12/48

Next Paper.

1292

30471 F.O.P

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL

1240

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Inverchapel, D: 10.01 p.m. 27th January, 1948  
No. 1421  
28th January, 1948. R: 3.29 a.m. 28th January, 1948.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York.

IMMEDIATE.  
DEDIP

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1421 of 27th January 1948. Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

TOP SECRET. AND PERSONAL

Following for Beeley from Allen. 21235/1-31


Falla's letter to me No. 52/42/48 of the 24th January. Collaboration with United States Government on Palestine.

2. We think that close cooperation with United States Delegation in New York on Palestine is highly desirable and I am glad to see that arrangements are proposed to give them copies of papers communicated to the Commission. State Department had already asked us to do this in Washington as well, on a purely informal basis. But with the possible exception of Loy Henderson (see the Ambassadors telegram No. 44), they have not been very ready to inform us of their views on Palestine policy partly no doubt because there are differences of opinion within the Department as to what United States policy is or should be. We cannot therefore contribute much by way of comment on Knox's views as reported by Falla, except the warning that it would be rash to assume that he were voicing a firm official view on all points. On many it is indeed doubtful whether a firm United States policy yet exists.

3. In principle we should be all in favour of a visit to Washington by Palestine advisers to the United Kingdom Delegation to discuss these matters with the State Department. But we think timing of such a visit would need careful consideration and also that we must be clear as to what would be its object. If purpose is to be merely exchange of information at working level, the visit might certainly be useful, particularly if State Department United Nations experts as well as Near East experts were brought in.

4. But we should have to be prepared for some cross-examination about our attitude and we should also be deluding ourselves if we thought that such an exchange of information were likely to have any appreciable influence upon development of American policy.

/At



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At least up to Loy Henderson's level in the State Department there is no serious lack of information nor of understanding of gravity of situation. There is however a natural difference of approach between his office of Near East Affairs, who are concerned chiefly with possible dangers to United States interests in the Middle East, and the Office of United Nations Affairs, who are preoccupied rather with effects of Palestine case upon the standing and authority of the United Nations. But it is pretty clear that, in last resort, American policy on Palestine is determined elsewhere and in part at least in response to other considerations.

5. In this connexion it is worth mentioning during brief visit to Washington last week-end that Federspiel told me that he had gained the impression that the State Department had to some extent regained control of formulation of Palestine policy. Moreover, Reston's article, summarised in our immediately following telegram, provides an additional indication that attempts are probably being made at the present time to form a properly thought-out Palestine policy more in accordance with national interests. But it is as yet too soon to say whether such efforts as the State Department may be making on these lines are likely to be successful.

6. L vett's remarks recorded in the Ambassadors telegram No.403 about the strong pressure upon him to lift the United States embargo on arms export to the Middle East in any case indicates that the Administration are still experiencing great difficulty in withstanding Zionist pressure. We are still inclined to abide by the estimate of the situation given in the Ambassadors telegram No.403, in which he expressed strong doubt about possibility of our securing any change in United States policy at present and indeed the wisdom of any attempt to do so, since overt pressure from ourselves to this end might well defeat its object.

7. In any event, if such an attempt were nevertheless to be made at some stage, it would have to be done at the highest level. The question of a visit to Washington by our Palestine advisers from New York should, in our view, be considered in relation to our policy in this respect. But at the same time, if the visit were decided upon it should be made quite clear to the State Department that it is not concerned with policy but only with exchange of information.

8. The Ambassador has seen this telegram and agrees.

A. A. ...

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Registry  
No. E 1246/78/31

Top Secret.  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

H. B.

~~IMMEDIATE~~  
~~TOP SECRET.~~

# CYPHER

3, 194  
**OUT FILE**

Draft. telegram  
WASHINGTON

of 3<sup>rd</sup> Jan

Despatched M.  
Addressed to Washington telegram No. 1267.

Repeated for information to U.K. Delegation, N.Y.  
Your telegram No. 421.

Telegram.

No. 1267

(Date) 3/1

Repeat to:—

United Kingdom  
Delegation,  
New York.

NO

*H. Beeley*  
207

~~Excluded~~  
~~Cypher~~  
Cypher.

Distribution:—  
Departmental.

Copies to:—

Following for Allen from Beeley.  
You will have seen from U.K. Delegation,  
New York's telegrams Nos. 191 and 222 <sup>that</sup> it is  
likely that there will be a debate on Palestine  
in the Security Council before long. In  
this event the Security Council/ rather than  
the Palestine Commission would probably  
occupy the foreground of any discussions which  
you and Sir A. Cadogan's advisers might  
have with the State Department. This being  
so, we think it would be advisable to postpone  
these discussions until ministerial decisions  
have been taken here as to our attitude on  
the Security Council.

2. I do not wish to suggest that we are in  
any way doubtful as to the advantage of this  
suggested contact with the State Department.  
On the contrary, we entirely agree that it  
would be valuable and we hope it will be  
possible to arrange it before Trafford Smith  
and Fletcher-Cook leave the United States. ~~But~~  
even though the purpose of the talks/ would/  
as you say/ be primarily to exchange information  
at the working level, it would probably be  
impossible to avoid discussion of policy  
altogether. It would/ therefore/ not be  
easy to conduct the talks before our policy  
in the Security Council has been defined.

3./

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

13556) Wt. 49897-140 100ms 3147 U.S.S. Gp 620

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3. Please see also the letter which I am writing in answer to Falla's letter of the 24th January and which I am repeating to you.

MSL

31.1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Green. 12

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Cypher/OTP  
E 1246/78/31  
Top Secret

DEPARTMENTAL

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 1267  
31st January, 1948. D. 3. 20 p.m. 31st January, 1948.

Repeated to New York United Kingdom Delegation No. 436

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 1267 of 31st January, repeated for information to U.K.Del. New York.

Your telegram No. 421.

Following for Allen from Beeley.

You will have seen from U.K. Delegation, New York's telegrams Nos. 191 and 222 that it is likely that there will be a debate on Palestine in the Security Council before long. In this event the Security Council rather than the Palestine Commission would probably occupy the foreground of any discussions which you and Sir A. Cadogan's advisers might have with the State Department. This being so, we think it would be advisable to postpone these discussions until ministerial decisions have been taken here as to our attitude on the Security Council.

2. I do not wish to suggest that we are in any way doubtful as to the advantage of this suggested contact with the State Department. On the contrary, we entirely agree that it would be valuable and we hope it will be possible to arrange it before Trafford Smith and Fletcher-Cock leave the United States. But even though the purpose of the talks would as you say be primarily to exchange information at the working level, it would probably be impossible to avoid discussion of policy altogether. It would therefore not be easy to conduct the talks before our policy in the Security Council has been defined.

3. Please see also the letter which I am writing in answer to Falla's letter of the 24th January and which I am repeating to you.

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13

1948

PALESTINE

E 1292

20 JAN 1948

Registry Number

E 1292/1078/91

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Lord Gower Chapel

Dated

Washington

Received in Registry

458  
28 Jan  
29 -

U.S. Political Policy.

Rept 11 x 221 New York tel 222 (E-1239/4/91)  
Reby of notes also added to memoranda in para 2  
of 11 Jan 1942 in that Dept of State had  
reached that State Dept followed by promulgation  
of Policy as implemented with UN. submitted  
- last part report of UN. probably back  
on the subject further (ambat)

Last Paper.

1246

(Minutes.)

The question in the last para. does not  
now arise.

273. 14/12

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

J. L. 10/12

(Index.)

J. L. 10/12

Next Paper.

1334

30471 F.O.F

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E 12921

E 14

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel  
No. 458

D. 2.47 a.m. 29th January 1948.

28th January 1948.

R. 8.30 a.m. 29th January 1948.

Repeated to Jerusalem  
Ottawa  
Moscow  
U.K. Del. New York

IMPORTANT  
SECRET  
LIGHT  
GIANT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 458 of 28th January, repeated to Jerusalem, Ottawa, Moscow and United Kingdom Delegation New York.

United Kingdom Delegation telegram No. 222 paragraph 5. Palestine.

Only concrete piece of information which can be added to general observations made in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 421 (not repeated to Jerusalem, Ottawa and Moscow) is that chief of Near Eastern Division of State Department remarked on 27th January that State Department felt unable to formulate any policy on implementation until the United Nations Commission had made their first report, which would, he thought, touch on this question. It was not he said, possible to aim at the target when one did not know where it was. The implication of his remark was that an attempt would be made to formulate a policy thereafter, but he was not to be drawn any further on this.

2. I do not think that it can be taken for granted that the United States Government intend if possible to avoid making up their minds on this question for some months to come. Loy Henderson, at any rate, is keenly aware of the various aspects of the partition plan and his people will, I believe try to produce a definite policy. It is of course quite possible that this attempt may ultimately be frustrated, but if so failure is more likely to be the result of differences of opinion in the State Department and elsewhere than the outcome of a vague hope that something will turn up. As it is there are signs of an

increasing

29 JAN 1948  
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increasing realisation that the situation is really serious and will not take care of itself. The present Zionist campaign for the lifting of the arms embargo and for United States support for a United Nations force will also foster such a realisation.

3. There is undoubtedly little keenness to contribute United States troops to a United Nations force (paragraph 8 of United Kingdom Delegation telegram under reference). It therefore looks as though a proposal for a force contributed by the smaller Powers would be given serious consideration. But this does not mean that we can entirely exclude the possibility of the despatch of a United States contingent, should the Security Council favour a Great Power force. Although the Administration has been opposed to this, it may conceivably come to feel that any form is better than none, in view of the damage which the prestige of the United Nations might otherwise suffer. If, moreover, a Great Power force is sent, the presence in it of a Soviet contingent, the danger of instability in the Middle East with the resultant threat to oil supplies, and domestic pressure may prompt the United States Government to favour the participation of a United States contingent. Eventual Congressional support might also be obtained for these reasons.

4. Whilst I naturally stand ready to take up the question of security I think that, in the light of the State Department's attitude described in paragraph 1 above, it would be inexpedient to do so before 10th February (United Kingdom Delegation's telegram No. 191 to Foreign Office paragraph 4). Assuming that your answer to paragraph 2(A) of the United Kingdom Delegation's telegram under reference is in the affirmative, I should in any case be grateful to know what you would like me to do say if I am asked for our views on the respective merits of a Great and a Small Power force.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem, Ottawa and Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 18, 2, and 5 respectively.

[Repeated to Moscow].

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem]

[Copy to Cypher Section Colonial Office for retransmission to Ottawa].

rrrrrr

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E 1334

16

1948

PALESTINE

JAN 1948

Registry Number E1334/1078/21

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

Lead Jerusalem  
Washington  
461.  
29 Jan  
30 -

U.S. Political Policy.

Mr Marshall stated at press conference that no  
negotiations were being given at present for a  
resolution of the American embargo against shipment  
of arms and ammunition to Palestine. He said  
American Policy in Palestine had not recently been  
taken up for re-examination, and added finally  
that the Policy of the U.S. at present was to support  
UN President in the matter.

Last Paper.

1292

(Minutes.)

House Palestine  
circulation.

References.

N.A. Dept. and sp

H.B. 207

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Matheson, BU  
Herman ~~and~~ Boboff  
M.I. 3a  
M104  
Admiral  
A.M.  
Feb 2

(Action completed.)

PP  
Edm/r

(Ink.)

10/2/48

Next Paper.

1348

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En Clair

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel.  
No. 461.

D: 3.05 p.m. 29th January, 1948.

29th January, 1948.

R: 8.07 p.m. 29th January, 1948.

Repeated to: U.K. Delegation New York,  
Jerusalem.

E 133

IMPORTANT


Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 461 of 29th January  
repeated U.K. Delegation New York, and to Jerusalem.

In answer to questions at a press conference on 28th January Mr. Marshall said, according to the New York Times, that no consideration was being given at present to a relaxation of the American embargo against shipment of arms and ammunition to Palestine. He also said that American policy in regard to Palestine had not recently been taken up for re-examination and added "tersely" that the policy of the United States at the present time was to support United Nations procedure in the matter. In answer to further questions he said that the State Department knew nothing of reports that King Abdullah of Transjordan intended to occupy part of Palestine and he described as untrue a press report (which appeared in P.M. on 28th January) that an American ship had been searched by the British at Haifa as a result of a tip from the State Department.

Foreign Office please repeat to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 19.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

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2 1948

PALESTINE  
EASTERN

E1348 /G B

E1348 11048 1/2  
31/6  
Washington  
440  
dated 29 Jan

U.S. Policy in Palestine:  
Arms embargo

Last Paper.

E1048

References.

E1229/1017/65  
E1334/1018/30

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

tel) London 1196  
30 Jan  
P) Col Chantaris W.D.  
5 Feb  
Tel) Cairo 166  
31 Jan  
Rpt) Bagdad 114  
Adda 70  
Beirut 68  
Damascus 49  
Amman 56  
RHEO 96  
P) Col Chantaris W.D.  
(Action completed.)  
2/2  
W/A

(Minutes.)

Draft tel. to Arab states.

H. Bealey 31/1

W.A.B.  
31.1

Next Paper.

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E1348 19

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DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel D. 8.43 p.m. 29th January, 1948  
No. 470  
29th January, 1948. R. 1.51 a.m. 30th January, 1948

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

Your telegram No. 1144.

I spoke as instructed to Lovett today.

2. He asked me to thank you for your prompt reply, but he was clearly disappointed. We went over the whole ground several times, and he was obviously impressed by the cogency of your arguments. On pressure he admitted that our reasons for maintaining the supplying of arms under our treaty obligations was perfectly valid. He said that he much hoped that the action described in your paragraph 8 would have the effect of inducing the Arab States concerned to see the wisdom of consenting to the temporary suspension of deliveries to either side. But, in the light of the trouble Congress was making he could not at this stage give any firm undertaking that the United States Government would maintain the embargo. He would carefully consider the suggestion that his Government should at once sound the Middle Eastern countries concerned. At first glance he thought it of doubtful value and likely to create "still greater hazards" so far as the Jews were concerned. He did not think there was any need for the discussions mentioned in your paragraph 7. The Americans and we knew the whole question by heart.

3. In the course of our talk I called his attention to a statement made yesterday to the press by Marshall (see my telegram No. 461). He said that did not mean that there had been any dwindling of Congressional pressure. He was expecting at any moment to see the intervention of Taft and he was clearly concerned about its probable consequences.

4. In the end he remarked rather sadly that the best thing his Government could now do would be to try to ride out the storm and he said that he could not forecast what would happen. Then as an afterthought he wondered whether it would be possible for you, perhaps by means of a question in Parliament, to make known the existing prohibition on the importation of arms into Palestine, which was not generally

/appreciated

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2.

appreciated in this country, and to emphasise that it applied to Jews and Arabs alike. As a pis-aller this might have a calming effect.

5. I drove home the point in your paragraph 9, and I hope with some effect. He said again and again that the last thing his Government wanted was the raising of the embargo.

[Copy sent to M.E. Secretariat].

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Registry

No. *E1318/078/9*

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Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Open

# CYPHER<sup>26</sup>

*30/1 1948*

*Despatched 1 20 P.M.*

Draft.

WASHINGTON

~~IMMEDIATE SECRET~~

Telegram.

No. *1196*

(Date) *Jan 30/48*

Repeat to:—

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*mtlsmight*  
*29.1*

~~EXCISE~~  
~~Code~~  
Cypher.

Distribution:—

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copies to:—

My telegram No. 1144 of 29th January:  
Palestine/

Report of Lovett's conversation with you sent by State Department to U.S. Embassy in London says that he represented that it would be most helpful if H.M.G. could take the two following steps:

- (i) Make flat statement that British as Mandatory Power will continue embargo on shipments of arms to Palestine except for maintenance of internal security.
  - (ii) Suspend all shipments of arms to Arab States pending clarification in U.N. of present confused situation.
2. As regards (i) position as mentioned in para 3 of my telegram under reference is that the Palestine Government have placed embargo on entry of arms into Palestine and will continue to enforce this embargo to the best of their ability until the Mandate terminates. There is no repeat no objection to statement to this effect being made or repeated either here or in Washington if this will help the U.S. Govt, and you have authority to issue a suitable statement at any time.

3. For your own information U. S. Embassy here have suggested that a statement on above lines coupled/

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coupled with statement that in addition to steps they have already taken HMG would suspend deliveries of arms to both sides other than those in the pipe-line would fully meet Lovett's wishes. You should not, repeat not, discuss this with Lovett but I should like your immediate views. In last resort it is possible that Middle East countries concerned might consider this the lesser of two evils.

This would of course mean an going less far than under alternative in second sentence of para 8 of my telegram under reference, since exception would be made of arms in the pipe line, which would presumably mean arms already ordered.

10/16

1947

10/16/47 Sir C. S. ...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 1196

30th January, 1948.

D. 1.20 p.m. 30th January, 1948

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

My telegram No. 1144 [of 29th January: Palestine].

Report of Lovett's conversation with you sent by State Department to United States Embassy in London says that he represented that it would be most helpful if His Majesty's Government could take the two following steps:

(i) Make flat statement that British as Mandatory Power will continue embargo on shipments of arms to Palestine except for maintenance of internal security.

(ii) Suspend all shipments of arms to Arab States pending clarification in United Nations of present confused situation.

2. As regards (i) position as mentioned in paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference is that the Palestine Government have placed embargo on entry of arms into Palestine and will continue to enforce this embargo to the best of their ability until the Mandate terminates. There is no (repeat no) objection to statement to this effect being made or repeated either here or in Washington if this will help the United States Government, and you have authority to issue a suitable statement at any time.

3. For your own information United States Embassy here have suggested that a statement on above lines coupled with statement that in addition to steps they have already taken His Majesty's Government would suspend deliveries of arms to both sides other than those in the pipe-line would fully meet Lovett's wishes. This would of course mean our going less far than under alternative reference, since exception would be made of arms in the pipe-line, which would presumably mean arms already ordered. You should not (repeat not) discuss this with Lovett but I should like your immediate views. In last resort it is possible that Middle East countries concerned might consider this the lesser of two evils.

///

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Registry  
No. E 1348/1078/G.

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Draft. H.M. Rep.,

Cairo. ✓

Telegram.

No. 166

(Date) 31<sup>st</sup> Jan.

Repeat to:—

Bagdad. 1/14.

No...

Jedda. ✓

No. 70

Beirut. ✓

No. 68

Damascus ✓

No. 49

Amman. No. 56

Repeat B.M.E.O. No. 96

~~Ex. Clair~~

~~Cutz~~

Cypher.

Distribution:—

Diplomatic Secret.

Copies to:—

H. Beely 31/1

Add<sup>d</sup> Cairo No 166 of 31<sup>st</sup> Jan 22  
to Bagdad, Jedda, F.O.,  
Beirut, Damascus 31/1  
Amman → rep<sup>d</sup> February, 1948.  
for info to B.M.E.O. Despatched 31/1 M.

~~TOP SECRET.~~

TOP SECRET.

My tel. No 143 to Cairo [of Jan 29]:  
arms for M.E.]

Lord Inverchapel has explained to  
HM Amb. at Washington  
Mr. Lovett our position as outlined in my  
telegram No. under ref. to under ref.. Lovett expressed  
the hope that the action taken by H.M.  
Representatives in the Middle East would have  
the effect of inducing the Arab States concerned  
to see the wisdom of consenting to the  
temporary suspension of deliveries. He could  
not, however, give any firm undertaking that  
the United States Government would maintain  
their embargo in the face of the pressure from  
Congress. At first glance he doubted the  
value of the suggestion that his Government  
should sound the Arab Governments concerned, but  
<sup>said</sup> it would be carefully considered.

2. Lovett's attention was drawn to  
Marshall's statement, at a Press Conference,  
that no consideration was being given at  
present to a relaxation of the American embargo  
against the shipment of arms and ammunition to  
Palestine. He said that this did not mean  
that there had been any <sup>lessening</sup> relaxation of  
Congressional pressure. On the contrary, he  
feared that it would increase.

3. He reiterated that the last thing  
that his Government wanted was to be compelled  
to lift the embargo, and suggested that we

might/

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might help him/ by calling attention through a parliamentary question to the existing prohibition on the import of arms to Palestine. We shall endeavour to take this action.

~~4. It thus appears less likely that a formal approach will be made to the Arab Governments on this subject by the Americans. Nevertheless, I hope to have before long the reports of H.M. Representatives on the Arab attitude to this problem.~~

4. In spite of Marshall's statement and of possible change Lovett's reaction against approach by U.S. Govt to Arab Govts we should still like to learn reaction of the latter to the question put in my tel. under ref. [Cairo only] pass to BmEO as 09631.

BASS

31.1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Cypher /OTP  
E 1548/1078/G  
Top Secret

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 166  
31st January, 1948

D. 9.45 p.m. 31st January, 1948

AND ALSO ADDRESSED TO BAGDAD NO. 114, JEDDA NO. 70,  
BEIRUT NO. 68, DAMASCUS NO. 49, AMMAN NO. 56.

Repeated to British Middle East Office Cairo No. 96.

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 166 of 31st January,  
and to Bagdad, Jedda, Beirut, Damascus, Amman. Repeated  
for information to British Middle East Office Cairo.

My telegram No. 143 to Cairo [of 29th January: arms  
for Middle East].

His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has explained to Mr. Lovett our position as outlined in my telegram under reference. Lovett expressed the hope that the action taken by His Majesty's Representatives in the Middle East would have the effect of inducing the Arab States concerned to see the wisdom of consenting to the temporary suspension of deliveries. He could not, however, give any firm undertaking that the United States Government would maintain their embargo in the face of the pressure from Congress. At first glance he doubted the value of the suggestion that his Government should sound the Arab Governments concerned, but said it would be carefully considered.

2. Lovett's attention was drawn to Marshall's statement, at a Press Conference, that no consideration was being given at present to a relaxation of the American embargo against the shipment of arms and ammunition to Palestine. He said that this did not mean that there had been any lessening of Congressional pressure. On the contrary, he feared that it would increase.

3. He reiterated that the last thing that his Government wanted was to be compelled to lift the embargo, and suggested that we might help him by calling attention through a parliamentary question to the existing prohibition on the import of arms to Palestine. We shall endeavour to take this action.

/4.

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24

4. In spite of Marshall's statement and of Lovett's reaction against approach by United States Government to Arab Governments we should still like to know reaction of the latter to the question put in my telegram under reference.

[Cairo only]. Pass to British Middle East Office as 0051.

PPP

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1948

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PALESTINE

E 100  
2 FEB 1948 25

Registry Number

E1406/1078/21

FROM

40 Minute

No.

Notes to Hill

Dated

20 Feb.

Received in Registry

US Pol Gas Policy

R. H. H. gave part of conversation he had had with Haskins who said that State Dept was considered as public opinion to be liberal they had new idea, what was it? State Dept would all the time that they had changed their minds regarding and it might be asked to maintain the status quo.

Last Paper.

1948

(Minutes.)

References.

H.B. 37/12

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

See 4/2/48

(Index.)

[Signature]

Next Paper.

1905

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Eastern Dept  
Embassy

ENCLOSURE  
2 FEB 1948

E  
26

SECRETARY OF STATE.

Dick Stokes asked to see me. He told me that he had been invited to dinner by a man called Hoskins, who apparently was adviser to the Middle East Section of the State Department, but is now employed in some executive post with one of the American oil concerns. Jamali, who is apparently a close friend of Hoskins, was also present.

Dick Stokes said that the point of the dinner was that Hoskins said to him that the State Department were now very disturbed about the Palestine situation and that he, Hoskins, believed that they were now hatching a new idea, with the consent of the White House, which amounted to this. They, the State Department, would tell the Jews that they had changed their mind about partition and we would be asked to remain in Palestine until after November to maintain the status quo, *if then the situation would be reconsidered in* and then the situation would be reconsidered.

Dick Stokes told Hoskins that this was an Alice in Wonderland dream. He said that if the State Department were now prepared to admit publicly that they had been wrong and withdraw their support for partition, then it might be that His Majesty's Government would also reconsider their position. He promised, however, that he would personally and informally pass on the information to you.

Stokes did not seem quite clear as to what Jamali's reaction was. But he said that he did not think that Hoskins would have put the idea with Jamali present unless Jamali had agreed to such procedure.

/I

Copies to:  
Sir O. Sargent  
Eastern Dept.

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I of course told Stokes that this was just another instance of American irresponsibility, but that I hardly thought that even the State Department could be so irresponsible as to believe that any Government would take an unsecured promise of this kind because plainly the State Department could give no indication of who was going to win the election and what the policy would be of the other side. I promised, however, that I would pass on the message to you.

*Hector McNeil*

January 20th 1948.

*Hector  
McNeil*

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1948

E

E 1905 28

PALESTINE,

10 FEB 1948

Registry Number E1905/1078/21

TELEGRAM FROM

No. Lord Rensvold

Dated Washington

Received in Registry 631.  
9 Feb  
10 -

US Palestine Policy.  
Refer Washington tel 421 (E1246/1078/21)  
In view of H.B. Ottawa tel 121 production are that  
an approach may be made (probably in strict  
confidence) with a request for any ideas, favored  
policy, which we may have for creating the ill  
effects of the U.N. recommendation upon British  
and American interests in the Middle East.

Last Paper.

~~1044~~ 1406

(Minutes.)

See within, Ottawa tel to CRO, no 121  
of the 6th Feb.

References.

Draft to Washington

(Print.)

H.B. Seeley 11/2

(How disposed of.)

H.B. 16/2

Int. P. 40. Minute Mr. Rensvold 16/2

This is, I take it, now dead and can be put away.

D. Balfour 8/3

Yes.

H.B. 9/3

(Action completed.)

J.C.H. 17/2

(Index.)

~~1044~~ 1406

Next Paper.

1958

30471 F.O.P

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Cypher/CTP

DEPARTMENTAL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

E 1905

Lord Inverchapel

No. 631

9th February, 1948.

D. 1.7 a.m. 10th February, 1948.  
R. 6.20 a.m. 10th February, 1948.

10 FEB 1948

Repeated to New York (U.K. Del).

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 631 of February 9th repeated for information to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

United Kingdom High Commissioner Ottawa telegram No. 121 to C.R.O. Palestine.

Although Canadian Ambassador has not yet told me of this conversation with Lovett various hints had already been reaching us from official and Congressional sources tending to confirm indications already mentioned in Washington telegram No. 421 that the Administration were seriously worried over Palestine situation. These hints together with the information in Ottawa telegram under reference seem to indicate that there is now a definite possibility that we may in the near future be approached rather suddenly and probably in strict confidence with a request for any ideas, however radical, which we may have for averting the ill effects of the United Nations recommendations upon British and American interests in the Middle East. It would accordingly be most useful if you could let me have as soon as possible your comments on Lovett's views as reported in Ottawa telegram under reference and about alternative solutions of the Palestine problem which might now be acceptable to His Majesty's Government.

[ Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat ]

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RECEIVED  
10 FEB 1948

With the Compliments of the  
Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth  
Relations

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and  
the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it  
to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

30  
9 FEB 1948

### Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office

ALLOTTED TO F.A. & U.N. DEPARTMENT

CYPHER (TYPEX)

D.II

From: U.K. High Commissioner in Canada

D. Ottawa 6th Feb., 1948. 6.40 p.m.  
R. 7th " " 1.45 a.m.

IMMEDIATE

No. 121

Addressed Commonwealth Relations Office London No. 121.

Please repeat to United Kingdom Delegation New York unnumbered for  
Sir A. Cadogan and Mr. Noel Baker and Embassy Washington as my  
Top Secret No. 3.

Your telegrams Nos. 98, 102 and 111.

#### Palestine

Pearson tells me that Hume Wrong, on instructions has  
had interview with Lovett with a view to ascertaining trend of  
United States thought on objectives to be aimed at when Commission's  
report comes before Security Council.

2. Result of interview has been very disturbing to Canadians.  
It appears that Lovett

- (1) indicated that the United States Government were not  
yet ready with considered views and would seek to  
have discussion at Security Council postponed.  
(They later asked McNaughton as Chairman to keep  
matter off Security Council agenda. After consulting  
Ottawa McNaughton replied that he could not do this  
but that it would of course be open to them to ask  
for postponement when item was reached).
- (2) Developed doubts as to constitutional validity of  
Assembly decision on partition and made it pretty  
plain that United States Government were now having  
second thoughts on whole matter.
- (3) Spoke of possibility that United States might decide  
to recommend summoning of a second Special Assembly  
to consider position afresh on the ground that the  
resolution passed by the original Special Assembly  
had proved impracticable.

3. In/

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3. In discussion Lovett added that any action of this kind would probably mean asking Britain to stay on for a while longer in Palestine for the purpose of keeping law and order and he spoke in rather harsh terms of our apparent intention to proceed with withdrawal irrespective of whether we left behind a vacuum or not.

4. Pearson said that idea of second Special Assembly filled everyone here with horror. Any such course would be bound to discredit the United Nations and destroy confidence in it. It could not veer about with the vacillations in American thought. He feared too that on this issue the seeds of serious friction were being sown between the United Kingdom and the United States for Britain would no doubt be made the scapegoat for the United States Government's change of attitude.

(Delayed owing to need for repetition. Repetition telegram received at 4.15p.m. 7th February)

(Copy to Foreign Office (Cypher Section) for retransmission to New York and Washington)

Copy to:-

Foreign Office	Sir Noel Charles
	Mr. H. Beeley
	Mr. J.P.G. Finch
Colonial Office	Mr. Martin

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Minutes.

E 1905 / 1078 / 71

31

With reference to Sir O. Sargent's minute on Washington telegram No. 631 below, I have certainly understood that we were precluded by the Secretary of State's instructions from giving the Americans any further comments, either on the legal and constitutional questions raised in the Ottawa telegram or on our ideas about alternative solutions.

*J.A.B. [Signature]*  
16th February, 1948.

*P.S.*  
Sir O. Sargent

*That was my own idea, but without the other members of the committee - at a loss*

*7/2/48*

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Cypher/CTP

DEPARTMENTAL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel

No. 631

9th February, 1948.

D. 1.7 a.m. 10th February, 1948.

R. 6.20 a.m. 10th February, 1948.

Repeated to New York (U.K. Del).

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 631 of February 9th repeated for information to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

United Kingdom High Commissioner Ottawa telegram No. 121 to C.R.O. Palestine.

Although Canadian Ambassador has not yet told me of this conversation with Lovett various hints had already been reaching us from official and Congressional sources tending to confirm indications already mentioned in Washington telegram No. 421 that the Administration were seriously worried over Palestine situation. These hints together with the information in Ottawa telegram under reference seem to indicate that there is now a definite possibility that we may in the near future be approached rather suddenly and probably in strict confidence with a request for any ideas, however radical, which we may have for averting the ill effects of the United Nations recommendations upon British and American interests in the Middle East. It would accordingly be most useful if you could let me have as soon as possible your comments on Lovett's views as reported in Ottawa telegram under reference and about alternative solutions of the Palestine problem which might now be acceptable to His Majesty's Government.

[ Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat ]

*East*  
FFFP  
*11/2*

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Inverchapel,  
No. 1421  
28th January, 1948.

D: 10.01 p.m. 27th January, 1948  
R: 3.29 a.m. 28th January, 1948.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York.

IMMEDIATE.  
DEDIP

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1421 of 27th January 1948. Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

TOP SECRET. AND PERSONAL

Following for Beeley from Allen.

Falla's letter to me No. 52/42/48 of the 24th January. Collaboration with United States Government on Palestine.

2. We think that close cooperation with United States Delegation in New York on Palestine is highly desirable and I am glad to see that arrangements are proposed to give them copies of papers communicated to the Commission. State Department had already asked us to do this in Washington as well, on a purely informal basis. But with the possible exception of Loy Henderson (see the Ambassadors telegram No. 44), they have not been very ready to inform us of their views on Palestine policy partly no doubt because there are differences of opinion within the Department as to what United States policy is or should be. We cannot therefore contribute much by way of comment on Knox's views as reported by Falla, except the warning that it would be rash to assume that he were voicing a firm official view on all points. On many it is indeed doubtful whether a firm United States policy yet exists.

3. In principle we should be all in favour of a visit to Washington by Palestine advisers to the United Kingdom Delegation to discuss these matters with the State Department. But we think timing of such a visit would need careful consideration and also that we must be clear as to what would be its object. If purpose is to be merely exchange of information at working level, the visit might certainly be useful, particularly if State Department United Nations experts as well as Near East experts were brought in.

4. But we should have to be prepared for some cross-examination about our attitude and we should also be deluding ourselves if we thought that such an exchange of information were likely to, have any appreciable influence upon development of American policy.

/At

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At least up to Loy Henderson's level in the State Department there is no serious lack of information nor of understanding of gravity of situation. There is however a natural difference of approach between his office of Near East Affairs, who are concerned chiefly with possible dangers to United States interests in the Middle East, and the Office of United Nations Affairs, who are preoccupied rather with effects of Palestine case upon the standing and authority of the United Nations. But it is pretty clear that, in last resort, American policy on Palestine is determined elsewhere and in part at least in response to other considerations.

5. In this connexion it is worth mentioning during brief visit to Washington last week-end that Federspiel told me that he had gained the impression that the State Department had to some extent regained control of formulation of Palestine policy. Moreover, Reston's article, summarised in our immediately following telegram, provides an additional indication that attempts are probably being made at the present time to form a properly thought-out Palestine policy more in accordance with national interests. But it is as yet too soon to say whether such efforts as the State Department may be making on these lines are likely to be successful.

6. Lovett's remarks recorded in the Ambassadors telegram No.403 about the strong pressure upon him to lift the United States embargo on arms export to the Middle East in any case indicates that the Administration are still experiencing great difficulty in withstanding Zionist pressure. We are still inclined to abide by the estimate of the situation given in the Ambassadors telegram No.403, in which he expressed strong doubt about possibility of our securing any change in United States policy at present and indeed the wisdom of any attempt to do so, since overt pressure from ourselves to this end might well defeat its object.

7. In any event, if such an attempt were nevertheless to be made at some stage, it would have to be done at the highest level. The question of a visit to Washington by our Palestine advisers from New York should, in our view, be considered in relation to our policy in this respect. But at the same time, if the visit were decided upon it should be made quite clear to the State Department that it is not concerned with policy but only with exchange of information.

8. The Ambassador has seen this telegram and agrees.

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1948

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E 1958 34

PALESTINE

11 FEB 1948

Registry Number E1958/1078/11  
 FROM Okareny  
 No. Washington  
 Dated 3/5/48  
 Received in Registry 2 Feb 11

U.S. Palestine Policy  
 After Washington til 1222 (E1238/1078/11)  
 re statement by James Reston,  
 New transmit document on same by Dr  
 Emanuel Neumann.

Last Paper.

1905

(Minutes.)

Para. 2. It is just possible that there is something in this.

References.

by G.O. [unclear]  
 N.A. Dept. [unclear]

W. Beely 11/12

B. Johnson

13.2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, 10 Feb 17<sup>h</sup>

H. [unclear]

14.2

(Action completed.)

G. [unclear] 26

(Index.)

[unclear]

Next Paper.

2104

E26513 F.O.P.

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E 1958

BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

11 FEB 1948

2nd February 1948

Ref: 3/54/48

Dear Department,

Please refer to our telegram No.422 of the 27th January reporting an article by James Reston in the New York Times about an attempt in the United States Administration to formulate a bi-partisan policy on all aspects of the Palestine question.

2. According to the Palcor News Agency, Dr. Emanuel Neumann, president of the Zionist Organization of America, alleged at a press conference in New York on the 29th January that the facts behind Reston's report were that Washington foes of the U.N. recommendations on Palestine had won over some Democratic politicians in Washington, who were now trying to prevail on Republicans to adopt an anti-Zionist policy which the Democrats would then endorse. This was, he said, an attempt to reverse the truly bi-partisan policy on Palestine which had been followed for years. He named Mr. Forrestal, Secretary of Defence, as the prime mover of the anti-partition forces, and asserted that the State Department and Forrestal were hoping that by steering clear of any participation in the implementation of partition, they would create a situation which would enable the United States or the United Nations to plead with Britain to stay on in Palestine under her own conditions, namely the Morrison Plan. Dr. Neumann expressed confidence that Congressional eyes would be opened to this plot, and gave a warning that a passive United States attitude towards Palestine would produce, not the Morrison Plan, but a conflagration in the Middle East in which the United States would eventually have to take part.

/ 3.

Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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3. Paltcor further reports that on the 28th January Dr. Neumann and Dr. Israel Goldstein, acting chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council, met a group of 70 Representatives and Senators, with whom they discussed Palestine. Dr. Neumann asked the Congressmen to press for the lifting of the American arms embargo and to persuade the U.S. Government not only to urge the United Nations to recognise Haganah as a militia, but also to take the lead in the Security Council for the establishment of an international police force. Dr. Neumann also urged that the United States should intervene with Britain and the Arab states in order to bring about the restoration of order in Palestine.

4. We are sending a copy of this letter to the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations at New York.

Yours ever,

Chancery  
*Sh*

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1948

EASTERN PALESTINE

E 2104

13 FEB 1948

37

Registry Number | E 2104/1078/31/c  
 TELEGRAM FROM  
 No. U.K. 12d  
 Dated New York  
 Received in Registry 462  
 12 Feb  
 13 -

U.S. Political Policy  
 Refer. Washington (1) 631 (E1905/1078/31)  
 Knowledge lost of the idea base of U.S. negotiating  
 and London from which it was gathered that  
 there was casting around somewhat vaguely for  
 ideas on a line which U.S. felt would have to hold  
 in security towards a final agreement report was  
 up for discussion.

Last Paper.

1958

References.

E 2690/49/C

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

1) New York 816  
 21 Feb  
 Rps to London 209,  
 2) Mr. Hall C.O.  
 24 Feb

(Action completed.)

G.P.H. 21/2

(Index.)

W.P.

Next Paper.

(Minutes.)

It would be rash to assume that  
 Mr. Knox's ideas necessarily represent official  
 thinking. But they do seem to reflect the same  
 anxieties as those <sup>recently</sup> expressed to the Canadian  
 Ambassador by Mr. Lovell. And I am afraid he  
 is probably right in the opinions recorded in  
 paragraph 5.

I submit a draft in answer to para. 4.

H.B. Bealey 13/2

*[Handwritten signature]*

S.P.P. PRO to H/C Canada 152 14/2

H.B. 23/2

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38

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 482

D. 8.50 p.m. 12th February, 1948

12th February, 1948.

R. 8.20 a.m. 15th February, 1948

Repeated to Washington  
Jerusalem

E 2:04

13 FEB 1948

IMPORTANT  
CLASS  
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 482 of 12th February repeated for information to Washington and Jerusalem.

Washington telegram No. 651.

Palestine.

Knox of the United States Delegation spoke to Lawford yesterday about Palestine. He is at present the member of the United States Delegation most closely concerned with the Palestine question: and though it is not clear how far his remarks were made on instructions, they may be straws in the wind.

2. On a previous occasion, a few days ago, he had expressed the view that if he could be given some account of His Majesty's Government's "policy" on the Palestine problem as a whole, as opposed to their views on detailed questions raised by the Commission, it might be possible for United States Delegation to exert some useful influence on Commission. On the present occasion he appeared to be casting about somewhat vaguely for ideas as to line which United States Delegation would have to take in Security Council when Commission's report came up for discussion. He thought it extremely likely that Soviet representatives would press for a force to be sent to Palestine and might volunteer a contingent. He emphasized that United States Government "did not intend" to send United States troops. For obvious reasons they would wish above all to avoid situation in which Soviet Government would be enabled to turn Palestine into another Korea, with added disadvantage that Soviet Government might claim that they must have lines of communication across countries between Palestine and Soviet Union; but I do not know whether, rather than allow Soviet alone to send troops,

/United

13 FEB 1948

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2.

United States Government might eventually contribute a contingent of their own.

3. In the circumstances Knox wondered what the attitude of United Kingdom Delegation would be if Security Council were to propose sending a force representing less important powers. When asked what sort of powers he was thinking of, he mentioned Canada, Australia and Czechoslovakia as examples. He seemed to think that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom might be able to put pressure on Canadian and Australian Governments in this respect. He was given no reason to think that this was a feasible suggestion. He said, however, that he presumed that we should not (repeat not) use our vote to prevent a decision in this sense. Incidentally Swedish representative who tells us that Knox made similar suggestion to him, says that such representatives of lesser powers as he has consulted on the subject say that their Governments would be strongly opposed to sending troops. Belgian and Canadian Delegations have also indicated to me that their Governments would be opposed.

4. Knox then reverted to the idea, already mentioned in conversation with other members of this Delegation, that King Abdullah might absorb area of Palestine not under the control of the Jewish State. I should be grateful for any comments you may have on this idea and for instructions as to what line should be taken if United States Delegation return to the matter. It would seem from Knox's remarks that the idea has certain attractions for the American mind.

5. In general he gave the impression that United States Delegation were seriously worried by whole question of implementation of Assembly's recommendation in its present form, but were at a loss for ideas as regards alternative solution. Though he spoke vaguely of possibility of summoning further special Assembly, he did not suggest that this was practical politics, if only because of strength of Jewish feeling. Zionists in the country, he thought, were by now so set on implementation of partition scheme that any other solution would seem to them inconceivable. If Democrats and Republicans could get together and agree to support proposal that whole question should be thrashed out again, Jewish vote in forthcoming elections would obviously lose its importance; but unfortunately, even if such agreement could be reached politicians here could not be relied upon to keep to it.

6. Purpose of Knox's remarks may have been merely an attempt to relieve his own mind, but I have thought them worth reporting as an indication of frankness with which United States Delegation admit that they are in a dilemma over Assembly recommendations on Palestine of which only a few months ago they themselves were the most enthusiastic protagonists.

7. I tried to sound Senator Austin this morning on the

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5.

subject but he said frankly that he had, as yet, no guidance from Washington though he hoped to have a talk with me later this week.

Foreign Office please repeat to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 92.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem].

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16 FEB 1948

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

P.W.  
E  
41

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

F.A. & U.N. DEPT.

F.2781/-  
CYPHER (TYPEX)

2104 1078 71

D.II.

TO: The U.K. High Commissioner in Canada.  
(Sent 9.45 p.m. 14th Feb., 1948.)

No. 152 SECRET.

Following is text of telegram 12th February No. 462 from New York to Foreign Office (repeated Washington and Jerusalem) repeated to you for information.

PALESTINE

Knox of the United States Delegation spoke to Lawford yesterday about Palestine. He is at present the member of the United States Delegation most closely concerned with the Palestine question: and though it is not clear how far his remarks were made on instructions, they may be straws in the wind.

2. On a previous occasion, a few days ago, he had expressed the view that if he could be given some account of His Majesty's Government's "policy" on the Palestine problem as a whole, as opposed to their views on detailed questions raised by the Commission, it might be possible for United States Delegation to exert some useful influence on Commission. On the present occasion he appeared to be casting about somewhat vaguely for ideas as to line which United States Delegation would have to take in Security Council when Commission's report came up for discussion. He thought it extremely likely that Soviet representatives would press for a force to be sent to Palestine and might volunteer a contingent. He emphasized that United States Government "did not intend" to send United States troops. For obvious reasons they would wish above all to avoid situation in which Soviet Government would be enabled to turn Palestine into another Korea, with added disadvantage that Soviet Government might claim that they must have lines of communication across countries between Palestine and Soviet Union/

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Union; but I do not know whether, rather than allow Soviet alone to send troops, United States Government might eventually contribute a contingent of their own.

3. In the circumstances Knox wondered what the attitude of United Kingdom Delegation would be if Security Council were to propose sending a force representing less important powers. When asked what sort of powers he was thinking of, he mentioned Canada, Australia and Czechoslovakia as examples. He seemed to think that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom might be able to put pressure on Canadian and Australian Governments in this respect. He was given no reason to think that this was a feasible suggestion. He said, however, that he presumed that we should not (repeat not) use our veto to prevent a decision in this sense. Incidentally Swedish representative who tells us that Knox made similar suggestion to him, says that such representatives of lesser powers as he has consulted on the subject say that their Governments would be strongly opposed to sending troops. Belgian and Canadian Delegations have also indicated to me that their Governments would be opposed.

4. Knox then reverted to the idea, already mentioned in conversation with other members of this Delegation, that King Abdullah might absorb area of Palestine not under the control of the Jewish State. I should be grateful for any comments you may have on this idea and for instructions as to what line should be taken if United States Delegation return to the matter. It would seem from Knox's remarks that the idea has certain attractions for the American mind.

5. In general he gave the impression that United States Delegation were seriously worried by whole question of implementation of Assembly's recommendation in its present form, but were at a loss for ideas as regards alternative solution. Though he spoke vaguely of possibility of summoning further special Assembly, he did not suggest that this was practical politics, if only because of strength of Jewish feeling. Zionists in the country, he thought, were by now so set on implementation/

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- 3 -

implementation of partition scheme that any other solution would seem to them inconceivable. If Democrats and Republicans could get together and agree to support proposal that whole question should be thrashed out again, Jewish vote in forthcoming elections would obviously lose its importance; but unfortunately, even if such agreement could be reached politicians here could not be relied upon to keep to it.

6. Purpose of Knox's remarks may have been merely an attempt to relieve his own mind, but I have thought them worth reporting as an indication of frankness with which United States Delegation admit that they are in a dilemma over Assembly recommendations on Palestine of which only a few months ago they themselves were the most enthusiastic protagonists.

7. I tried to sound Senator Austin this morning on the subject but he said frankly that he had, as yet, no guidance from Washington though he hoped to have a talk with me later this week.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. J.P.G. Finch  
Mr. H. Beeley

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Registry.

No. *E 2005/1078/15*

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Restricted.
Open.

# CYPHER

February 1948

*TOP*  
Despatched 12 500 M.

Draft. *B.A.B.B.*  
U.K. Delegation,  
New York.

*TOP*  
**SECRET**

Addressed to U.K. Delegation, New York, No. 816 of 21<sup>st</sup> February. Repeated for information to Washington.

Telegram.

No. *816*  
(Date) *21<sup>st</sup> Feb*

Your telegram No. 462 [of February 12th: Palestine], paragraph 4.

Repeat to:—

Washington *209!*

For your own secret information, we too see certain advantages in this idea, but there are also obvious and important difficulties and dangers. The chief of these is that it would be most embarrassing to us if Abdullah either came into conflict with the United Nations or took up an entirely isolated position in regard to the other Arab States and it is rather difficult to see how he can steer between these two dangers.

*J.M. [Signature]*  
*19.2*  
*File*  
*21.2.*

2. For the present it seems undesirable for us to have any discussion of this question with the Americans beyond that suggested in my telegram No. *A2090* to Washington. It is preferable that even discussion on these lines should be confined to contact between H.M. Embassy and the State Department and I suggest that if you are approached again by the United States Delegation you should adopt a non-committal attitude.

*En-Clair.*  
*Code.*  
*Cypher.*

Distribution:—

Diplomatic Secret

Copies to:—

*[Copy sent to the Secretariat]*  
*[Signature]*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(33054) W.L.14090/147 100,000 0/47 A.A. E.W. Ltd. Gp.685

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Top Secret

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No: 816

21st February 1948

D. 12.50.p.m. 22nd February 1948

Repeated to Washington No: 2091

TOP SECRET

Addressed to U.K. Delegation New York No: 816 of 21st February, repeated for information to Washington.

Your telegram No: 462 [of February 12th: Palestine], paragraph 4.

For your own secret information, we too see certain advantages in this idea, but there are also obvious and important difficulties and dangers. The chief of these is that it would be most embarrassing to us if Abdullah either came into conflict with the United Nations or took up an entirely isolated position in regard to the other Arab States and it is rather difficult to see how he can steer between these two dangers.

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[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

X:X:X:

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 462

D. 8.30 p.m. 12th February, 1948

12th February, 1948.

R. 2.20 a.m. 13th February, 1948

Repeated to Washington  
Jerusalem

IMPORTANT  
GLANT  
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 462 of 12th February repeated for information to Washington and Jerusalem.

Washington telegram No. 631.

Palestine.

Knox of the United States Delegation spoke to Lawford yesterday about Palestine. He is at present the member of the United States Delegation most closely concerned with the Palestine question: and though it is not clear how far his remarks were made on instructions, they may be straws in the wind.

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/United

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2.

United States Government might eventually contribute a contingent of their own.

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/subject

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subject but he said frankly that he had, as yet, no guidance from Washington though he hoped to have a talk with me later this week.

Foreign Office please repeat to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 92.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem].

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PALESTINE

E 2200

16 FEB 1948

Registry Number } E2200/1078/31  
 FROM  
 Embassy  
 No. Washington  
 Dated t. W. Beley  
 Received in Registry } 10 Feb  
 16 -

US Palestine Policy  
 Copy of letter from W.D. Allen to Paul Galla of Feb 10 referring to Fletcher Barker letter to J. M. Smith (E 1955/1/21) covering receipt of comments with object of F. Beley about Palestine  
 Transmit memo on same, and give further examples of U.S. Govt's uncertainty re their Palestine Policy. Probable that 11 Feb 48 may soon be announced re the whole Palestine situation

Last Paper.  
2104

(Minutes.)

H-13. 16/12

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)  
 J. E. M. 17

(Index.)  
 [Handwritten signature]

Next Paper.  
2205

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48

10th February 1948

**SECRET**

Thank you for sending me, in your letter 52/128/48 of the 6th February, a copy of Fletcher-Cooke's letter to Martin at the Colonial Office of the 6th February giving an account of his interview with Major George Fielding Eliot about Palestine. We are shortly sending to London an account of press comment on the subject as a whole and will pass a copy to you.

2. I think that Ormerod really knows Eliot better than anyone here. But our impression of him is that, although personally reliable, sincere and friendly to us, he is not a deep thinker and not to be counted among the really first rate correspondents.

3. Before saying anything about his plan, I think it is worth telling you that hints had reached us, too, to the effect that some in the Administration were in fact wondering whether we could not be persuaded to stay in Palestine longer, if some modification of or alternative to the partition plan could be devised. Another pointer was provided in a recent report from the Passport Control Office in New York of a conversation which a member of that Office had with a senior official of the Zionist Organization of America. This official has occasion to see the Passport Control Office fairly frequently on visa and immigration matters, with which it is his function to deal. Towards the end of January he asked the Passport Control official, during a routine visit, what his impressions were as to the possibility of the British Government's continuing to stay in

P.S. Falla, Esq.,  
 United Kingdom Delegation  
 to the United Nations,  
 New York, N.Y.

/Palestine

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Palestine beyond May or August - particularly if such a suggestion were to come from the Jewish Agency or from the United Nations. About a week later, on another visit, he said that he had discussed the matter with Weizmann, who had laughed and had produced a communication on similar lines from the Overseas News Agency's representative in Palestine. Shortly after that he telephoned to the Passport Control Office to say that Weizmann was seriously considering telegraphing to London with the suggestion that a feeler should be put out to H.M.G.

4. Our Passport Control official contented himself with saying that it was not his affair. But he expressed the personal opinion that, although H.M.G. might be prepared to consider such a proposal if it came from the Jewish Agency or the United Nations, they would need a great deal of persuading, if only because of public opinion in Britain. The above information should be treated as strictly confidential, since we get useful information from this source from time to time, and it is important that he should not be compromised.

5. I must confess that I share Fletcher-Cooke's views about Eliot's plan. The only circumstances in which I could conceive of H.M.G.'s agreeing to it would be if the Jewish Agency were themselves to support the proposal, and also bring the terrorists to heel, and if the Arabs were prepared to accept it - i.e. if security in Palestine could be looked after by a man and a boy.

6. Ottawa telegram No.121 to C.R.O. confirms that the U.S. Administration are in fact seriously worried about the situation. Their idea would, I believe, not be so much that we should be left to bear the whole burden of preserving peace in Palestine, as that the interests of both our countries in the Middle East will be threatened by the repercussions of the United Nations recommendations. These would obviously be particularly serious if the Security

/Council

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1948 3	PALESTINE EASTERN	E2205/G 51
E-2205 110781 31/6 F.O. Minute Mr Roberts Dated 13 Feb.	U.S. attitude to Palestine question.	
Last Paper E1348	(Minutes)	
References	7-13 17/12	
(Print)		
(How disposed of) New York Tel) W'lon 641 13 Feb Rptd W'lon 1835 Ottawa Tel) New York 610 13 Feb Rptd W'lon 1836 Ottawa.		
(Action completed) 2/17/2	(Index) W.H.	
Next Paper		

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Registry  
No.

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
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Open.

Draft.

U.K. Del. New York  
and Washington.

Telegram.

No. Feb 13.

(Date)

Repeat to:—

U.K. High Comm-  
issioner, Ottawa.  
(via C.R.O.)

~~En Clair.~~

~~Code.~~

Cypher.

Distribution:—

Reftal

Copies to:—

Mr. Martin,  
Conolial Office

# CYPHER

February 13 1948 . 52

Despatched 11 2 M.

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET.

Addressed to U.K. Delegation New York  
tel No. 671 dated Feb 13 and Washington, No. 671 dated Feb 13.  
Information to ~~Washington, No. 671 dated Feb 13~~, Ottawa.  
Following personal for Colonial

Secretary and Ambassador. Telegram No. 121  
from U.K. High Commissioner in Canada to  
C.R.O. and Washington telegram No. 631  
[of February 9th; Palestine].

We are watching these developments  
with the greatest interest. I am giving you  
in this telegram my personal reactions so that  
you may know how our minds are moving here.  
2. This new American attitude seems to be due  
largely to our firm attitude. The Americans  
have at last been brought to face the facts  
and not unnaturally find them distasteful.  
We must do nothing to oppose any such American  
initiative, but at the same time we must be  
careful to guard against the all-important  
danger of giving any impression that we would  
maintain our responsibility in Palestine beyond  
the dates announced, on the ground that dis-  
cussions were continuing about a new solution.  
To avoid this pitfall, we must continue to make  
it clear that we will not deviate from our  
announced policy of withdrawal.

3. It follows that - (a) we should not  
ourselves make any proposals for a new plan in  
response to American enquiries as this might  
result in our being pressed to extend the  
period /

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



period of our responsibility.

(b) we should not record an opinion on the legal and constitutional questions which have been raised. Consistent with our policy we should remain neutral.

4. I had in any case been intending to give you my general views on how the situation might develop and how we should do our best to avoid being blamed for the impracticability of the U.N. decision. These are contained in my immediately following telegram.

*Approved by [Signature] 13/2*

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Green

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on]

Cypher /OTP  
Top Secret

DEPARTMENTAL

53

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 671  
15th February, 1948

D. 11.25 p.m. 15th February, 1948

AND TO WASHINGTON NO. 1835

Repeated to United Kingdom High Commissioner, Ottawa.  
(via Commonwealth Relations Office).

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York  
telegram No. 671 of 15th February, and Washington, repeated  
for information to Ottawa.

Following personal for Colonial Secretary and  
Ambassador. Telegram No. 121 from United Kingdom High  
Commissioner in Canada to Commonwealth Relations Office  
and Washington telegram No. 631 [of 9th February: Palestine].

We are watching these developments with the greatest  
interest. I am giving you in this telegram my personal  
reactions so that you may know how our minds are moving  
here.

2. This new American attitude seems to be due  
largely to our firm attitude. The Americans have at last  
been brought to face the facts and not unnaturally find  
them distasteful. We must do nothing to oppose any such  
American initiative, but at the same time we must be  
careful to guard against the all-important danger of giving  
any impression that we would maintain our responsibility  
in Palestine beyond the dates announced, on the ground  
that discussions were continuing about a new solution.  
To avoid this pitfall, we must continue to make it clear  
that we will not deviate from our announced policy of  
withdrawal.

3. It follows that -

(a) we should not ourselves make any proposals  
for a new plan in response to American enquiries as  
this might result in our being pressed to extend the

/period

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- 2 -

54

period of our responsibility.

(b) we should not record an opinion on the legal and constitutional questions which have been raised. Consistent with our policy we should remain neutral.

4. I had in any case been intending to give you my general views on how the situation might develop and how we should do our best to avoid being blamed for the impracticability of the United Nations decision. These are contained in my immediately following telegram.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

PPP

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13th February, 1948.

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# CYPHER

Despatched 17.00 M.

BABB

Draft.

U.K. Del. New York and Washington

Telegram.

No. ....

(Date) Feb 13

Repeat to: -

U.K. High Comm. Ottawa

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*not to be made secret for any reason of U.S. BABB*

~~En-Clair~~  
~~Code~~  
Cypher.

Distribution: -

Political

Def Secret

Copies to: *W. J. P. Colonial Office*

*S. J. P.*

~~Immediate~~ *Top Secret*

Addressed to U.K. Del. New York No. 672/7613 and to Washington

Repeated to U.K. High Commissioner, Ottawa. for information

Following for Colonial Secretary and

Ambassador. *U.S. of the information contained in from U.K. High Commissioner in Canada to the C.R.C.*  
It may be useful for me to set out at this

stage my ideas of how the Palestine situation is likely to develop in the near future and, in particular, what steps we can take to avoid the danger that we shall be attacked by the U.N. Commission and in the American press as being mainly responsible for the difficulties experienced by the Commission in carrying out the U.N. decision. *Therely take made as the course for the changed attitude of U.S.*

- The positive steps on our part which I envisage at present are -
  - (1) We would allow a small party of officials of the U.N. Commission to go to Palestine.
  - (2) The Commission itself or some of its members should come to London *to have all the information they need, need*
  - (3) We should *see if we can* arrange a slightly longer overlap between the arrival of the Commission in Palestine and the termination of the Mandate.
  - (4) We should make known that we favour the establishment of an open city in Jerusalem and the neighbouring holy places. We are proposing to approach the Arab Governments on this point. If

their/

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their response is favourable we would then suggest to the Commission that they might approach the Jews.

3. If by the time we get out no effective measures of conciliation have been put in hand and the U.N. decision has not been changed, there will no doubt be a period of guerrilla activity which will be held to constitute a danger to peace and will thus be subject to Security Council's examination. Whether the Security Council discusses the matter at this or an earlier stage, we would hope that it would turn its attention <sup>again</sup> ~~more~~ to the question of producing an agreed settlement, ~~then to the more or less impossible task of devising means for carrying out the present unacceptable decision.~~

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten initials]

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Cypher/OTP  
Secret

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 672.

D. 12.10 a.m. 14th February, 1948.

15th February, 1948.

And to Washington No.1856.

Repeated to: Ottawa.

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation, New York, telegram No. 672 of February 15th, and Washington, repeated for information to United Kingdom High Commissioner, Ottawa.

Following for Colonial Secretary and Ambassador.

In view of the information contained in telegram No.121 from United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada to the Commonwealth Relations Office it may be useful for me to set out at this stage my ideas of how the Palestine situation is likely to develop in the near future and, in particular, what steps we can take to avoid the danger that we shall be attacked by the United Nations Commission and in the American press as being mainly responsible for the difficulties experienced by the Commission in carrying out the United Nations' decision, and thereby be made the excuse for any changed attitude of United States.

2. The positive steps on our part which I envisage at present are -

(1) We would allow a small party of officials of the United Nations Commission to go to Palestine.

(2) The Commission itself or some of its members should come to London in order to have access to all the information they need.

(3) We should see if we can arrange a slightly longer overlap between the arrival of the Commission in Palestine and the termination of the Mandate.

(4) We should make known that we favour the establishment of an open city in Jerusalem and the neighbouring holy places. We are proposing to approach the Arab Governments on this point. If their response is favourable we would then suggest to the Commission that

/they ..

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- 2 -

they might approach the Jews.

8. If by the time we get out no effective measures of conciliation have been put in hand and the United Nations' decision has not been changed, there will no doubt be a period of guerrilla activity which will be held to constitute a danger to peace and will thus be subject to Security Council's examination. Whether the Security Council discusses the matter at this or an earlier stage, we would hope that it would turn its attention again to the question of producing an agreed settlement.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat]

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E

E 2211

58

1948

17 FEB 1948

Registry Number E2211/1378/31  
 FROM  
 No. *Washington*  
 Dated *11/3/15/48*  
 Received in Registry *11 Feb 17 -*

*US Political Policy*  
 The press and Radio are saying US feet in  
 sole of shoes when a hot list. *General* copy of  
 cable by the *Alger* line, sitting out body of  
 difficulties with it. US heart in favor and  
 reinforces the indications that a battle is in  
 progress in the *Edwards* area which  
 forecast is said to be the *same* opponent of  
 reaction.

Last Paper.

2205

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*8, 60*  
*April 15*  
*(under E 2213)*

(Action completed.)

*9/21/4*

(Index.)

*[Handwritten initials]*

Next Paper.

2213

(Minutes.)

The *Alger's* article is interesting

See also E 2213

*Copy C.O.*  
*N.A. Dept.*

*H. B. Zeeley 17/12*

*[Handwritten initials]*

*17 2*

In the light of the *Austrian's*  
 Security Council statement of  
 the 19th March & the *Marshall's* press  
 conference explanation of the 20th the  
*Alger's* article looks very much like  
 an officially-inspired 'trial balloon',  
 sent out to test Zionist reactions  
 to a possible change in US policy on  
 Palestine.

*[Signature]*  
*19/12*

*[Handwritten initials]*

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E 59

BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

11th February 1948

RESTRICTED  
Ref: 413/15/48

E 22.11

Dear Department

Recent press comment on Palestine was reported in the section on that country contained in our telegram No. 26 Saving of the 6th February (Survey of American press and radio trends for the week ending on that day). Pleas for effective U.S. action continue to be made by various papers such as the Washington Times-Herald, the Kansas City Star, the Wichita Beacon, the Detroit News, and the Oregonian. But voices on the other side are also being heard. A series of articles by Leigh White in the Chicago Daily News blames American policy towards Palestine for the rejection by Iraq of a U.S. loan for a Tigris and Euphrates Valley Authority, and of American teachers for high schools in Iraq. (The loan is a figment of the writer's imagination). White also stresses the facts that the United States is losing the friendship of the Arab world and that the forcible creation of a Jewish state would make it necessary for American troops to protect U.S. oil interests in the Middle East, which would in turn encourage turmoil in the area and weaken Arab resistance to the Soviet Union. Among wireless commentators, both Heatter and Kaltenborn view the situation with alarm. The latter says that the provision of a U.N. force would create more problems than it would solve and that force is not, and never has been, the answer to the Palestine problem.

2. Even more outspoken on the subject is an article by the Alsop brothers (a copy is enclosed) which appeared in the Washington Post and other newspapers on the 9th February. This article sets out

/clearly

Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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clearly the difficulties with which the United States Government is faced and reinforces the indications which had reached us from other sources that a battle is in progress within the Administration in which Forrestal is said to be the main opponent of partition. This battle, first mentioned by Reston in the New York Times (see our telegram No.422), has also been the subject of recent allusions by some of the more sensational wireless commentators such as Winchell and Pearson, and by pro-Zionist newspapers such as P.M., which vigorously attacked the Alsops' views in an editorial on the 10th February. This editorial argued that at best only grudging Arab friendship could be gained, that the Arabs could not afford to dispense with oil royalties, that U.S. honour was the most important American interest, and that the U.S. Government could not afford to weaken the authority of the United Nations. The editorial did not comment upon the reference to racial hatred in the Alsops' "slick and poisonous statement", but this is of course very much to the fore in the minds of a great number of American Jews. The arguments of the rival contendents are well summarised in the enclosed extract from the article in the Washington Times-Herald of the 10th February by John O'Donnell.

3. There is no doubt that, with the continuance of disturbances in Palestine and the near approach of a discussion of the question in the Security Council, most serious thinkers on the subject have come to realise that the problem is many-sided and extremely difficult and dangerous. Comment is of course divided according to sympathies, and a good deal of support for U.N. action naturally comes from those who are primarily concerned with the prestige of the United Nations. But there is now a general awareness that the Administration has become much less convinced of the wisdom of its previous policy. Those who for various reasons support partition are therefore redoubling their efforts to restore the status quo

/in

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in so far as the Administration's views are concerned.

4. We are sending a copy of the letter to the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations at New York.

Yours ever,

Chancery

*Ch*

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E 2213

62

1948

PALESTINE

17 FEB 1948

Registry Number } E2213/1078/31  
 FROM }  
 No. } *Blancery*  
 Dated } *Washington*  
 Received } *4/13/17/48*  
 in Registry } *12 Feb*  
 } *17 -*

*U.S. Political Policy*  
 After Washington letter 4/13/48 (E2211/1078/31)  
 transmit further article by *Alfred Hoyt* which  
 appeared in *Washington Post* 11 Feb.  
 If this in any way near the truth it is a  
 further indication of the battle which is now  
 raging about U.S. Political Policy.

Last Paper.

2211

(Minutes.)

*21*  
 Very interesting. See also E 2211

References.

*by [unclear]*  
*N.A. [unclear]*  
*✓ [unclear] 19/15*  
*H.B. [unclear] 17/12*

(Print.)

The S. of S. might refer to  
 in the reference, to the 1946 negotiations.

(How disposed of.)

*8.00*  
*April 15*  
*(with E 2211)*

*[unclear] 17.2*

*O. G. [unclear] Feb 18*

(Action completed.)

*[Signature]*  
*12/21/48*

(Index.)

*[Signature]*  
*10/21/48*

Next Paper.

E 2330

[26513 F.O.P.]

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E 63

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

12th February 1948

Ref: 413/17/48

E 2211

Dear Department,

Please refer to our letter 413/19/48 of FEB 1948  
the 11th February about newspaper and wireless  
comment on Palestine.

We enclose herein a further article by  
the Alsop brothers on this subject which  
appeared in the Washington Post on 11th  
February. If this is anywhere near the truth  
it is a further indication of the battle  
which is now raging about U.S. policy on  
this question.

We are sending a copy of this letter to  
the United Kingdom Delegation to the United  
Nations at New York.

Yours ever,

Chancery

bc

Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

*I thank them for their  
but remind them gently what  
a state they got us when I received  
this Soviet story in the house  
of the...  
what a state they got us when I received  
this Soviet story in the house*

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E

E 2530

64

PALESTINE

18 FEB 1948

1948

Registry Number

E2330/1078/31

FROM

Blancery

No.

Washington

Dated

4/13/15/48

Received in Registry

12 Feb

18 -

U.S. Palestine Policy.

Gives list of names of 30 Republicans who have sent a further letter to the UN regarding Palestine.

They express deep concern about the violence in Palestine between Arabs and Jews, and about the lowest alarm of many American citizens about U.S. Policy towards Palestine.

Last Paper.

2213

(Minutes.)

References.

by G.O.

N.A. Dept. 2/24

D. Balpan

2/2

H.B. 23/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8/60

Feb 24

(Action completed.)

G.L.H. 27/2

(Index.)

[Handwritten initials]

Next Paper.

2331

26513 F.O.P.

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E 65

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

Ref: 413/18/48

12th February 1948

E 2030  
JB 2030

Dear Department,

It is reported in the press that a group of thirty Republican members of the House of Representatives which had already written to Mr. Marshall about Palestine in April and July of last year, has sent him a further letter on this subject on the 10th February.

2. This letter stated that the group believed that there was grave danger that, if the United Nations recommendations were rendered inoperative, far more even than that decision might be jeopardised and the United Nations itself might become ineffective. They expressed deep concern about the violence in Palestine between Arabs and Jews and about the honest alarm of many American citizens about United States policy towards Palestine. They asked Mr. Marshall whether it was true that Britain was still permitting arms to be shipped to the Arab nations, and if so, whether the continuance of such shipments interfered with the execution of the U.N. recommendations. The group also asked whether the activities of the Arab nations in support of the Arab Higher Committee's announced policy of violent resistance to the U.N. recommendations endangered the maintenance of international peace and security within the meaning of the United Nations Charter.

3. Further questions addressed to Mr. Marshall concerned the instructions which were being sent to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations about the means of implementing partition and the degree of

/assistance

Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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assistance which the U.S. Government was prepared to give to that end.

4. Those who signed the letter included Christian A. Herter of Massachusetts, Robert J. Twyman, William G. Stratton and Richard B. Vail of Illinois, and Jacob K. Javits, Kenneth B. Keating, Edwin Arthur Hall, R. Walter Reihlman and David M. Potts of New York. Others included James C. Auchincloss and Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, Edward A.M. Mitchell of Indiana, Howard A. Coffin and Harold F. Youngblood of Michigan, John C. Brophy of Wisconsin, George H. Bender of Ohio, George Mackinnon and Edward J. Devitt of Minnesota.

5. Mr. Marshall was asked at his press conference on 11th February whether the United States still backed the idea of a volunteer U.N. force. According to the press, he gave no direct reply and simply stated that the U.S. Government had not changed its position in that it was still supporting the Palestine procedure agreed upon in the United Nations.

6. We are sending a copy of this letter to the U.K. Delegation at New York and to Jerusalem.

Yours ever,

Chancery

*xe*

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1948

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E 2331

67

PALESTINE

18 FEB 1948

Registry Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

E2331/1078/51

O'Leary  
Washington

413/19/48

13 Feb  
18 -

U.S. Palestine Policy.

Refer Washington letter 413/19/48 (E2330/1078/51),  
14 Feb 1948, which referred to remarks by  
Mr. Marshall on Palestine. Mr. Marshall at the Press  
Conference on the 12th was also questioned. He said  
that the goal of the U.S. was supporting the  
U.N. settlement of the Palestine issue. He refused  
to go any further.

Last Paper.

2330

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, 80  
1 Feb 48

(Action completed.)

EdM 27/

(Index.)

EdM 27/

Next Paper.

2380

(Minutes.)

by 1/19/48  
M.A. 1/19/48

D. B. Alford  
2/2

H.B. 27/2

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BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

13th February 1948

Ref: 413/19/48

Dear Department,

In the fifth paragraph of our letter 413/18/48 of the 12th February we referred to some remarks about Palestine made by Mr. Marshall at his press conference.

2. At his press conference on 12th February, President Truman was also questioned on the subject. According to the press, he said that the Government of the United States was supporting the United Nations settlement of the Palestine issue and he refused to go any further than this in response to other enquiries.

3. He did, however, go a little further in reply to a letter from Representative Frank Buchanan (D., Pennsylvania), which was made public on the 12th February. In this letter the President said "Palestine has been a matter of considerable disturbance to me ever since the Japanese surrender and I've been endeavoring to get the matter worked out. It's now in the hands of the United Nations and this Government is backing the United Nations in the settlement they have suggested." Although the headline to this news item in the New York Times is "Truman Says U.S. Backs Partition", this newspaper's comment upon the item was to the effect that the President's disinclination to discuss the problem was being interpreted as an indication that the whole question was being studied at the highest level.

4. We are sending copies of this letter to Jerusalem and to the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations at New York.

Yours ever,

Chancery

Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

68

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78

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E 2531 69

24 FEB 1948

1948

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E2531/1074/31

FROM

Planetary

No.

Washington

Dated

11/3/21/48

Received in Registry

16 Feb  
24 -

U.S. Palestine Policy  
before Washington & the UN (E2213/1074/31) Now encloses two articles entitled "The Palestine Problem" by H.W. Baldwin from "New York Times" dated 13 and 14 Feb. They show increasing interest in the problem by more serious writers.

Last Paper.

2380

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

*[Signature]* 2/3

(Index.)

*[Signature]*

Next Paper.

2532

(Minutes.)

with notes, especially the second part.

D. Balpan  
24/2

N.A. Report - 20/2

H. Beeley 25/2

PARIS

26.2

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270

2031  
14 FEB 1948

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

16th February 1948

Ref: 413/21/48

Dear Department,

Please refer to our letter 413/17/48 of the 12th February enclosing a further article by the Alsop brothers on Palestine.

2. We enclose two articles entitled "The Palestine Problem" by Hanson W. Baldwin, which appeared in the New York Times on the 13th and 14th February. Although Baldwin's conclusion is the negative one that none of the possible courses of action promises stability in the Mediterranean or the preservation of U.S. strategic interests there, and that the United States is on the horns of a dilemma, he does bring out very clearly all the complications. This is further evidence that the more serious writers who are thinking about this problem are now becoming increasingly conscious of what it entails.

3. We are sending a copy of this letter to the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations at New York.

Yours ever,

Chancery

*for*

Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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E 2532 71

1948

PALESTINE

24 FEB 1948

Registry Number E2532/1078/11  
 FROM  
 No. Chancery  
 Washington  
 Dated 4/13/23/48  
 Received in Registry 16 Feb  
 24 -

U.S. Palestine Policy  
 Refer Washington letter 4/13/18/48 of 12 Feb  
 re letter from 20 Republican Congressmen to  
 Mr Marshall  
 New transcripts list of Mr Marshall reply  
 to Mr Tamm and the other Congressmen.

Last Paper.

2531

(Minutes.)

References.

copy C.O.  
 N.A. Dept. of State 2/2

D. Balfour 2/2

H.B. 25/12

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, P.O.  
Feb 26<sup>th</sup>

(Action completed.)

*[Signature]*

(Index.)

*[Signature]*

Next Paper.

2628

26513 F.O.P.

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Ref: 413/23/48

RESTRICTED

2032  
24 FEB 1948

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

16th February 1948

Dear Department,

Please refer to our letter 413/18/48 of the 12th February about a letter concerning Palestine sent by thirty Republican Congressmen to Mr. Marshall.

2. On the 16th February the State Department released to the press the text of Mr. Marshall's reply to Mr. Javits and the other Congressmen.

A copy of this press release is enclosed.

3. We are sending copies of this letter to Jerusalem and to the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations at New York.

Yours ever,

Chancery

*sc*

Eastern Department,

Foreign Office,

London, S.W.1.

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**FO 371 / 68648**

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

FEBRUARY 16, 1948  
NO. 120

Following is the text of a letter concerning Palestine to the Honorable Jacob K. Javits from the Secretary of State:

February 12, 1948

"Dear Mr. Javits:

"I have received a letter dated February 10, 1948, signed by you and twenty-nine other Members of the House of Representatives. This letter expresses your joint concern over violence in Palestine between Arabs and Jews, your worry lest the announced policy of the Department of State of an arms embargo to the Arab countries and Palestine may be misleading as to the intentions of the United States, and your apprehension that if the United Nations Palestine decision is rendered inoperative the United Nations itself may be made ineffective. In reply to your specific questions I desire to inform you that copies of this letter are being addressed separately to the other Congressmen who signed the communication of February 10.

"Taking your questions seriatim I quote the first:

"(1) 'Is it true that Great Britain is permitting arms to continue to be shipped to the Arab nations, and if so, does the continuance of such shipments interfere with carrying out of the United Nations decision on Palestine?'

"On February 4, 1948, the British Minister of Defense made an official reply in Parliament which largely covers your inquiry. He said, among other things:

"'There is at present an embargo on the entry into Palestine both by sea and over the land frontiers of all war-like material. The Government of Palestine will enforce this embargo to the best of their ability until the Mandate comes to an end on the 15th of May. It is also the policy of His Majesty's Government to refuse permission for the export of military material from Great Britain to any part of the Middle East except under existing contracts which have been undertaken as a result of our treaty obligations to certain Arab Governments. His Majesty's Government have no reason to suppose that the material supplied by them under such contracts will be used in Palestine.'

"This Government has no information in its possession indicating that to date the continuance of British treaty shipments has interfered with the carrying out of the recommendation of the General Assembly on Palestine embodied in its resolution of November 29, 1947.

"(2) 'Do the activities of the Arab nations with respect to support of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, and the Arab League, or otherwise in their announced violent resistance to the U. N. decision on Palestine, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security in the terms of the U. N. charter?'

"While

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"While it is true that various Arab Governments and organizations have announced their determined opposition to the General Assembly's recommendation on Palestine, there have thus far been no overt acts which, in the decision of the Security Council of the United Nations, have been determined to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security in the terms of the United Nations Charter. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, as the Mandatory Power, is responsible for the preservation of peace and security in Palestine. The United States has consistently proclaimed its determination to see the provisions of the United Nations Charter complied with, and its Representative in the General Assembly, in announcing this Government's policy regarding Palestine on October 11, 1947, said that we assumed there would be Charter observance.

"(3) 'What will be the instructions of the U. S. to its U. N. delegate on the questions referred by the U. N. Palestine Commission to the Security Council regarding the means for making effective the General Assembly's decision on Palestine?'

"The United Nations Palestine Commission has thus far submitted its first interim report to the Security Council but the Council has not yet taken action on the report. On February 10 the Council agreed to await the forthcoming special report of the Palestine Commission on the problems of security and enforcement before giving further consideration to the General Assembly's recommendation on Palestine. This report is due February 15. In absence of knowledge as to the contents of the Palestine Commission's next report it has been impossible to formulate instructions to the United States Representative on the Security Council.

"(4) 'What is the U. S. prepared to do to help in the implementation of the U. N. decision on Palestine?'

"I believe that much of this question is implicitly answered in my response to Question 3. Until the Security Council has received and studied the report of the Palestine Commission on security and enforcement and has reached a decision it is not possible for this Government to determine in advance the steps which may be necessary to carry out such a decision. However, the United States has been active as a member of certain other principal organs of the United Nations which are dealing with the Palestine problem to implement the resolution of November 29. The United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council and his Deputy have worked with other Members of the Council in preparing a draft statute for the trusteeship of Jerusalem. The United States as a Member of the Economic and Social Council will be concerned with those aspects of the resolution of November 29 which call for action by the Economic and Social Council. Practically every major organ of the United Nations is concerned under the terms of the Assembly's resolution.

"I much appreciate your patriotic interest in this question and your concern for the success of the United Nations. As the President and I have on several occasions made clear, we regard the solution of this immensely difficult problem as a United Nations solution and our contribution to that end will be as a member and steadfast supporter of the United Nations.

"Faithfully yours,

"GEORGE C. MARSHALL"

\* \* \*

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5 1948

PALESTINE  
EASTERN

E2628/G  
74

E2628/10781  
31/G  
New York  
612  
dated 21 Feb.

U. S. Policy regarding  
Palestine

Last Paper.

E2380

(Minutes)

References.

H.B. 251  
12

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Ted New York 851  
23 Feb.  
Rpd to Lon 2169

(Action completed.)

2F 27/2

(Index.)

W/S

Next Paper.

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**FO 371 / 68648**

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*Handwritten: E2628 75*  
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Cypher/OTP

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 612

D. 2.57 p.m. 21st February 1948

21st February 1948 R. 8.52 p.m. 21st February 1948

Repeated to Washington

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 612 of 21st February repeated for information to Washington.

Following personal from Secretary of State for the Colonies for the Foreign Secretary.

[Begins]

Palestine.

Bearson of Canadian Delegation called on me yesterday afternoon and asked me to keep in confidence what he had to say.

2. He said that he had had a long informal and confidential talk with Rusk, Head of the State Department Office of United Nations Affairs, on the subject of the line which the United States representative will take during discussion of the Palestine problem in the Security Council next week. Rusk had been entrusted with the task of drafting Austin's speech on the basis of instructions received after lengthy discussion between the President and Mr. Marshall. It was likely that Bearson would be asked to go over the draft speech informally with Rusk in Washington during the weekend. Bearson has promised to keep us informed.

3. First point likely to be put forward by United States Delegation is the legal issue dealt with in Washington telegram to Foreign Office No. 814 and referred to in United Kingdom Delegation telegram No. 588. Bearson was not precise as to what proposals United States Delegation wished to see emerge, nor on the probable course the discussion in the Security Council would take. It seems, however, that the United States Government would not wish to see the Security Council committed to the immediate creation of an international force because of the many difficulties of such a plan, nor would they wish to be committed themselves, if they can possibly avoid it, to take part in enforcement. In any event, it is doubtful whether requisite number of votes could be obtained in the Security Council for enforcement action. The Americans would appear to hope that some escape from their / dilemma.....

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dilemma may be found in the creation of some form of conciliation machinery.

4. As regards the Canadian point of view, Pearson indicated that they were averse to allowing a stalemate to occur. Of the remaining alternatives (i.e. enforcement or reconsideration of the plan), Pearson was obviously not in favour of attempting to create an international force on general grounds that such force, whatever form it took, could not be created in time. A middle power was obviously not a desirable solution from his point of view and the nature of the problem made a small power force both unsuitable and impracticable. As to a great power force there were obvious objections.

5. As regards the possibility of reconsideration of the plan, the Canadians were thinking along the lines of an attempt to create some form of conciliation committee drawn from the permanent members of the Security Council in preference to the uncertainties of a special assembly to reconsider the problem ab initio. Pearson thought that both they and the Americans would wish that the Security Council should be in a position to attempt conciliation between the opposing parties and to make, on its own initiative, any adjustments in the plan that might result if conciliation were successful.

6. Pearson went on to ask whether I could give him any indication of the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I said that my instructions on two points were quite firm:

(1) that our dates had been determined and could not be varied;

(2) that consistent with our declarations and previous line of policy, and in view of the heavy contribution both of resources and lives already made by the United Kingdom to the Palestine problem, we could not agree to contribute to any international force that might be decided on to impose the Assembly's policy.

7. In regard to conciliation, I said that we had always felt that some form of accommodation between Jews and Arabs offered the only hope of a lasting solution. To that end, we had devoted the efforts of the past two years, which had, however, been brought to naught principally by the intransigence of the two communities in Palestine. There may be much to be said for an attempt at conciliation even now, but the facts of the present situation must be faced. The Jews now regard statehood as their minimum demand. Having been granted it by the United Nations decision, they will not lightly abandon it in favour of the kind of federal solution which would be the maximum concession we could hope to obtain from the Arabs. Pearson indicated that the United Kingdom would undoubtedly be asked to serve on / a.....

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
a conciliation committee of the kind suggested, and that we might be faced with the idea that perhaps the United States Government should attempt to persuade the Jews to agree to some modified scheme, while the United Kingdom should try and persuade the Arabs. I said that I felt that there would be very great difficulties in attempting to persuade the extreme elements of the Jews as well as the Arab States, in their present mood, to adopt a less intractable policy; and also that we should have to weigh our own position very carefully before becoming involved in conciliation machinery.

8. I should be grateful for your views as to whether I should give some support to conciliation. It is clear that we must preserve our impartial attitude towards the Assembly's resolution and not become too involved in the complicated situation in which the Security Council now finds itself as a result of United States policy. We must try and avoid creating more prejudice against ourselves by playing too active a part in proposals which may not be readily acceptable to Arabs and Jews. There are, of course, considerable practical difficulties in the way of any conciliatory effort by the Security Council, not the least of which will be the attitude of one or both communities to such effort. The Russians also may reject such a line. I feel that whatever the Security Council may wish, we must at this stage stand firm and irreconcilable as to any concession on the dates of termination of the mandate and of evacuation of our forces.

[Ends]

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Registry  
No.



B.B.

# CYPHER <sup>78</sup>

23rd February, 1948.

Despatched M.

Draft.

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

U.K. DELEGATION,  
NEW YORK

Telegram.

No. 851.

(Date) 23/2.

Repeat to:—

WASHINGTON.

2169

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*Cypher*

~~Ex Clair.~~  
~~EXCL~~  
Cypher.

Distribution:—  
World Organisation

PRISec

Copies to:—

C:O.

My of Defense

*You must not be misled  
by your name not be misled  
by initials  
by initials*

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

E

Inter 979

Cypher/OTP  
Secret

PR I S E C

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK.

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 851

23rd February 1948. D. 8.25 p.m. 23rd February 1948  
Repeated to Washington No. 2169.

MOST IMMEDIATE.  
SECRET.

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 851 of February 23rd repeated for information to Washington.

Your telegram No. 612 [of February 21st; Palestine].  
Following for Colonial Secretary from Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

I assume that any proposal for conciliation would involve abandonment of the Assembly decision. This seems improbable on our present information. This is for your own guidance.

2. Our position is in any case clear. We must maintain the dates already announced. If a new situation emerges as a result of official proposals in the Security Council we shall have to consider it afresh and you will no doubt refer back for instructions. Meanwhile you should abstain from voting and if pressed for an opinion reserve the position of His Majesty's Government.
3. We are keeping the whole situation under careful study and will send you our considered view when the outlines are clearer. Meanwhile we should be grateful for your comments and those of Sir Alexander Cadogan on the assumption in paragraph 1 above.
4. You must not be misled by intrigue.

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E2628/1078/C  
AMENDED DISTRIBUTION (24th February, 1948).

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CYPHER/OTP  
Secret.

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 851. *Prime*

D: 8.25 p.m. 23rd February, 1948.

23rd February, 1948.

Repeated to: Washington No. 2,169.

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 851 of February 23rd repeated for information to Washington.

Your telegram No. 612 [of February 21st; Palestine]. Following for Colonial Secretary from Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

I assume that any proposal for conciliation would involve abandonment of the Assembly decision. This seems improbable on our present information. This is for your own guidance.

2. Our position is in any case clear. We must maintain the dates already announced. If a new situation emerges as a result of official proposals in the Security Council we shall have to consider it afresh and you will no doubt refer back for instructions. Meanwhile you should abstain from voting and if pressed for an opinion reserve the position of His Majesty's Government.

3. We are keeping the whole situation under careful study and will send you our considered view when the outlines are clearer. Meanwhile we should be grateful for your comments and those of Sir Alexander Cadogan on the assumption in paragraph 1 above.

4. You must not be misled by intrigue.

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1948

PALESTINE  
EASTERN

E2643 / G  
81

E2643 / 1048 / G  
31/G  
New York  
643  
Dated 24 Feb.

U.S. Policy to Palestine

Last Paper.  
E2628

(Minutes.)  
Tel. call to N.Y. (no. 890).

References.  
E2628 / 1048 / G  
E2628 / H / G

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(How disposed of.)  
Copied F.H.

(Action completed.)  
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(Index.)  
H.F.H.

Next Paper.

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No. 10  
Mini. Defence  
Mr. Rec. Williams  
S/B  
Mini. State  
Sir O. Sargent  
Mr. M. L. ...  
Eastern Dept.  
25/2  
82

Cypher/OTP

NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

PRISEC

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 643  
24th February, 1948  
D. 9.33 p.m. 24th February, 1948  
R. 3.44 a.m. 25th February, 1948

Repeated to Washington

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

LIGHT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 643 of 24th February repeated for information to Washington.

Following from Colonial Secretary for Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram No. 851.

Palestine.

Account of today's deliberations in Security Council is contained in my telegrams Nos. 640 to 642.

2. You will see that United States representative has put forward a definite proposal (paragraph 13(B) of my telegram No. 641) for the establishment of conciliatory machinery.

3. As a tentative view (for we have not yet heard the views of other powers) Cadogan and I feel that we cannot easily pursue a negative and unconstructive attitude to the procedure proposed in Austin's speech. We have no desire to become too much involved in the effort of the United States of America or of the United Nations to disentangling the difficulties which now exist. But so far as the investigation of the possible threat to international peace is concerned, we feel that we could not properly refuse to cooperate with the Council in view of our obligations as a member of the United Nations.

4. The second part of Austin's objective for the proposed/

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proposed committee is conciliation of the parties. There can be no departure from the position which I stated this morning in respect of enforcement, but it seems to us that we can assist as hitherto to the extent of giving the committee the benefit of our factual information and experience. The Austin proposal limits conciliation within the framework of the Assembly's resolution, i.e. the plan for partition, but we doubt if much progress can be made within these limits. On the other hand it seems possible that although the tentative "resolution" suggested by the United States of America is framed in the words "consult ..... concerning the implementation of the General Assembly's recommendation" the United States Government may be hoping that once conciliatory machinery is set in motion it may be possible (although for obvious reasons they cannot make this suggestion openly at this stage) to allow a gradual movement away from the present partition plan towards a compromise solution which might be acceptable to all parties. The difficulties which stand in the way of such a development are apparent, but should it occur, it might then be possible for us to review our position as to whether a more active part can be taken by us.

5. I should be grateful for any views you can offer to guide us.

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister]

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1948

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2662

84

PALESTINE

26 FEB 1948

Registry Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

E 2662/1078/31

Chancery  
Washington

413/26/48

19 Feb  
26 -

U.S. Palestine Policy.

Refer to your letter 413/19/48 (E 2331/1078/31)  
at 1948 Conference held on 18 Feb. At that time  
said that U.S. had reached an approximate  
decision on the instructions which would be given  
to U.S. Representatives on Security Council.  
He refused to comment on particular points.

Last Paper.

2643

(Minutes.)

D. Balpan  
26/2

References.

N.A. 27/10/48  
by 250

H.B. 24/12

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, 80  
Mar 3

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Edw 4/3

4/3/48

Next Paper.

2773

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BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

19th February, 1948.

Ref: 413/26/48

Dear Department,

Please refer to our letter of the 13th February about President Truman's remarks concerning Palestine.

2. At a press conference held on the 18th February Mr. Marshall said, according to the press, that the United States had reached an approximate decision on the instructions which would be given to the United States Representative on the Security Council about Palestine. Beyond stressing that action on Palestine was of very great importance for the future of the United Nations, he refused to make any comment in reply to a large number of questions about the United Nations police force, the arms embargo and partition in general.

3. According to the New York Times, observers were inclined to deduce from his attitude that the United States would take a position somewhere between the extremes of upsetting the partition plan on the one hand and of sending American troops to Palestine at the present time on the other. A further conjecture was that the instructions might be found to favour no hard and fast course but might perhaps suggest alternative courses of action. It is, in any case, clear that the United States' attitude will not be known until their delegate to the United Nations has occasion to speak.

4. We are sending copies of this letter to the United Kingdom Delegation, New York, and to Jerusalem.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

*bc*

Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W. 1.

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1948

E

2773 | 86

PALESTINE

28 FEB 1948

Registry Number  
FROM E2773/1078/31

No. 6 January  
Washington  
Dated 14/3/28/48  
Received in Registry 21 Feb  
28 -

U.S. Palestine Policy  
Senior Democratic Leaders (according to press) used the occasion of the recent Jefferson - Jackson Day dinner in W. Va. to express again upon the Democratic Party leadership that President Truman must take immediate and forceful action about Palestine. They called immediate lifting of arms embargo and UN Rq. for Security Council should be instructed to work for the establishment of a U.N. Policy Council to implement Partition.

Last Paper.

2662

(Minutes.)

N.A. Dyer 15/3

273 17/3

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

7 Feb 16/3

(Index.)

15/3

Next Paper.

2662

26513 F.O.P.

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Ref: 413/28/48

1. 27/5  
28 FEB 1948

BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

21st February, 1948.

Dear Department,

According to the press, senior Democratic leaders in New York used the occasion of the recent Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner in Washington to impress again upon the Democratic Party leadership that President Truman must take immediate and forceful action about Palestine. They informed the national leaders that only positive action, taken at once, could keep New York State in the Democratic camp in the November elections.

2. They asked that the embargo on the shipment of arms to Jews in Palestine should be lifted immediately and that the United States representative on the Security Council should be instructed to work for the establishment of a United Nations' police force to implement partition. They also informed Democratic leaders of the dissatisfaction of Jewish elements in New York State with the State Department's handling of the Palestine problem, and apparently urged that Mr. Loy Henderson should be removed from his post. Reference was also made to the recent Democratic defeat in the Bronx election, which was due, according to these New York representatives, to dissatisfaction with the Administration's policy on this question.

3. It is also reported in the press that on the 20th February the Connecticut Legislature urged that the arms embargo be lifted and that an international police force be created for service in

/Palestine.

Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W. 1.

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- 2 -

Palestine. The resolution embodying these requests was passed unanimously, and it also urged that the Security Council brand the actions of the Arab States as a threat to world security.

4. It is obvious that very great pressure is now being put upon the Administration in view of the approaching discussion of the whole question by the Security Council, and the failure of the Democrats in the Bronx election is proving a useful weapon for those who, for various reasons, wish the United Nations to implement partition.

5. We are sending a copy of this letter to the United Kingdom Delegation, New York.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.  
*sch*

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E 2860 } 89

1948

PALESTINE

2 MAR 1948

Registry Number E2860/1078/31

FROM *Plenary Washington*

No. *Washington*

Dated *3/9/48*

Received in Registry *24 Feb 2 Mar*

*U.S. Palestine Policy.*  
*Ref to letter 3/8/48 (E2864/107/25)*  
*no demand that the U.S. Govt should help to*  
*implement the U.N. recommendations on Palestine.*  
*Enclose statements on the subject by*  
*Director Dept of State and the Administration*  
*to support the establishment by the U.N. of*  
*a moderate force in Palestine and by military*  
*forces to demand that the U.S. Govt take a lead*  
*in implementing Palestine.*

Last Paper.

*2773*

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

*P 2/11/48*

(Index.)

*10/2/48*

Next Paper.

*2642*

(Minutes.)

*D. M. G. 2/3*  
*H. B. 9/3*

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Ref: 3/97/48  
CONFIDENTIAL

**E 2860**

**2 WAR 348**

BRITISH EMBASSY, E 90

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

24th February, 1948.

Dear Department,

Please refer to our letter 3/82/48 of the 19th February about demands that the United States Government should help to implement the United Nations recommendations on Palestine.

2. We enclose herein a statement on that subject issued by Senator Taft on the 21st February, in which he called upon the Administration to support the establishment by the United Nations of a "moderate force" in Palestine.

3. The timing of this was obviously convenient in that it was generally known that final decisions on United States policy concerning Palestine in the Security Council were being taken over this last week-end. It must also be remembered that Rabbi Silver, whose home is in Cleveland, Ohio, is a constituent of Senator Taft's and may have had some influence in determining the latter to speak up at this particular moment. But the statement itself is skilful in that, while looking towards both the supporters of Zionism and those of the United Nations, it appeals only for a moderate force and thus slides away from the awkward question of United States participation therein.

4. It is indeed interesting to note that, as can be seen from the statement issued by the New York State Democratic Committee, which is quoted below, politicians are for the first time beginning to realise that there may be votes to be lost as

/well

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Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W. 1.

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well as votes to be gained by supporting partition, in that partition now obviously requires a force for its implementation. This may possibly involve the dispatch of United States troops, which may in turn result in United States casualties. One thing on which there is fairly general agreement is that United States troops should not be involved, and some apprehension on this score is now being voiced.

5. On the 23rd February another Presidential candidate, Mr. Henry Wallace, also issued a statement in which he demanded that the United States Government take the lead in implementing partition and accused the Truman Administration of attempting to delay a decision until after the election. A copy of his statement is enclosed.

6. Simultaneously, the New York State Democratic Chairman, Mr. Paul Fitzpatrick, in an attempt, according to the New York Times, to prevent Mr. Wallace and his third-party movement from capitalising on the Palestine issue, made public a programme addressed to the New York State Democratic members of Congress, urging in different words much the same policy as Mr. Wallace.

7. The programme which Mr. Fitzpatrick urged the New York State delegation in Congress to support was as follows:-

- (i) To bolster the United Nations in its first important decision lest its effectiveness for peace be destroyed.
- (ii) To press for the removal of the United States embargo on the shipment of arms to the Middle East.
- (iii) To urge the United States Administration to inform the British Government clearly that they would not tolerate "the scuttling of partition"; and

/(iv) To

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- 3 -

- (iv) To support the United Nations Commission's request for a "voluntary police force" for Palestine.

Disingenuously Mr. Fitzpatrick added that it was not necessary to send United States forces since Palestine did not want American troops.

8. A programme was also produced jointly on the 23rd February by Mrs. Roosevelt, Mr. Lehman, Senator Elbert Thomas (D., Utah) and Mr. Sumner Welles - all strong Zionist supporters. This policy contained the following four points:

- (i) The immediate establishment of a United Nations police force composed of international contingents under Articles 39 and 42 of the Charter.
- (ii) "Activation" of this force as soon as British troops leave Palestine, or earlier if requested.
- (iii) Invocation if necessary of Article 41 of the Charter providing for measures short of force; and
- (iv) The lifting of the United States embargo on the export of arms to the Middle East in favour of those in Palestine who are willing to abide by the United Nations recommendations.

9. The statement which accompanied these proposals declared, according to the New York Times, that the avowed Arab determination to resist by force a pacific settlement of the Palestine issue posed the question of the authority of the United Nations. If its authority were successfully challenged by the weak States of the Middle East, no confidence could be placed in the ability of the United Nations to meet and master future

/crises

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crises to which, perhaps, major powers might be parties. After noting that the Assembly's resolution on Palestine had the concurrence both of the United States and of the Soviet Union, the statement concluded by saying that the hopes raised by this must not be shattered by inaction or timidity at the present time.

10. A copy of this letter is being sent to the United Kingdom Delegation, New York. This and later letters will not be copied to the High Commissioner at Jerusalem unless they deal with illegal immigration. In answer to a recent enquiry of ours he has told us that he now feels obliged to ask that these reports should no longer be sent to him owing to the great pressure of work caused by the approaching termination of the Mandate.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.  
*Sc*

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1943

PALESTINE	E 2943 / G 94
EASTERN	

E 2943/1048/31/48  
 Mr. Holt  
 Vedda  
 Mr. Bullock  
 520/3/48  
 dated 22 Feb.

U. S. Policy to Palestine.

Last Paper  
 E2943

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 25/3	(Index) W.S.
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Next Paper

(Minutes)

N. American Div. 11/3

D. Ballpen 4/3  
 B. Beely 4/3

L.F.L. Pyman  
 # 5/3

Quite interesting

B.A.S. Sumner  
 5/3

W. L. Knight  
 6.3.

W.S.

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**FO 371 / 68648**

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3 MAR 1948

**CONFIDENTIAL** *enter C*

520/3/48

British Embassy,

URGENT

E

JEDDA

95

E2943 23rd February 1948

*Dear Burrows,*

3 MAR 1948

I send you herewith for your information two minutes recording what Childs has told me about a recent leakage of secret matters. It looks as though something will now be published by both sides.

*Yours ever  
Alan Trott*

P.A.P. Burrows, Esq.,  
Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W. 1.

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Enclosure to Jeddah letter 520/3/48 dated  
22nd February 1948

-----  
U.S.A. attitude about Palestine.

Mr. Childs tells me that on very secret instructions from the State Department he recently asked the Saudi Arabian Government whether they were now prepared to modify their attitude about Palestine. (Mr. Childs had already told them that such an approach was quite hopeless from the start and whatever the U.S.A. Government offered them would make no difference).

The reply came in in most uncompromising terms and was delivered by the Amir Faisal at Jeddah on the 6th February.

Yesterday the Amir Faisal sent for Mr. Childs and said that he had heard on the radio that this all leaked out on the U.S.A. radio system; i.e. some announcer had definitely given the story. The Saudi Arabian Government were most incensed that this leakage had occurred.

Mr. Childs declared his ignorance of the whole thing and said he would enquire. However he felt that it was probably true; he knew how loosely these things were often dealt with in Washington and he was quite prepared to hear that the Saudis had heard it on the radio.

Anyway this incident made it all the more unlikely that the King would behave as the State Department wanted him to behave in the interview he was just going to have with His Majesty.

(Signed) A.C. TROTT

18. ii. 48

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Enclosure to Jeddah letter 520/3/48 dated  
22nd February, 1948

U.S.A.-Saudi exchanges about Palestine

Mr. Childs told me last night that the King had showed a good deal of displeasure about the recent leak of news on the American radio about the above. The radio announcement had said that the King had refused all help in settling Palestine (or something offensive of that sort).

The King said that he would therefore be forced to publish both documents; i.e. the approach from President Truman and the reply he gave; both very secret documents.

Mr. Childs objected that while it would be quite correct for him to publish the Saudi document it would hardly be right for the King to publish the U.S.A.'s secret communication without the permission of the U.S.A. Government.

The King seems to have been taken aback at that.

Mr. Childs thought that summaries of both of the documents would eventually be made public and he was telegraphing about that.

The King in the course of his remarks said that while he could explain the whole thing to the Arab leaders without difficulty or embarrassment he could not explain it to the Arabs as a whole, now that the (incorrect) story had been broadcast to the world.

Mr. Childs was not at all surprised that there had been such a leakage. He knew only too well

/how

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how things worked in the State Department, and  
how large was the influence which the Jews had  
in all departments of the administration.

(Signed) A.C.TROTT

22/2/75

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<p>1948</p>	<p>PALESTINE</p>	<p>E2996/G</p>
<p>E2996 11048/3 31/G F.O. Minutes for Harwick dated 1 March</p>	<p>EASTERN</p> <p>U.S. <u>policy in Palestine</u></p>	
<p>Last Paper E2943</p>	<p>(Minutes)</p> <p>D. Balfour 4/3 HB 4/3</p>	
<p>References</p>		
<p>(Print)</p>		
<p>(How disposed of)</p>		
<p>(Action completed) 25/3</p>	<p>(Index) left.</p>	
<p>Next Paper</p>		

34092

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4 MAR 1948

E Minutes.

TOP SECRET.

Sir O. Sargent  
Mr. Wright  
Eastern Department.

*Handwritten initials*

*E-2996*

*E-166*  
*99*

*BARB 2.3*

When the Secretary of State dined with the American Ambassador on the evening of February 28th the subject of Palestine came up.

Mr. Douglas said that he had not heard anything from Washington on this subject. The U.S. Government were trying to extricate themselves from the impossible position they had got into. The Secretary of State said that we could not stay on in Palestine after the date which had already been announced. He said that if he thought he could help Mr. Marshall with any ideas which occurred to him, he would let him have them very privately. If anything were to be done, however, the Jews would have to give up a good deal, as well as the Arabs. Perhaps, however, everyone had been put in such a difficult position owing to U.S. policy that they might all like to get out of it.

*John H. ...*  
1st March, 1948.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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PALESTINE  
EASTERN

E 3662 / G  
2 MAR 1948 100

E 3662 / 1042 / 31/6  
F.O. Minutes  
dated 20 March

U.S. policy to Palestine

Last Paper  
E 2996

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)  
100) W'lon 3195  
20 March  
Rpt New York  
✓ 1236  
8) C.O. 22 March

(Action completed)  
2F 26/3

(Index)  
W/S

Next Paper

(Minutes)  
Now see replies at E 3726 and 3727  
D. Balfour  
1943. 227/3

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No. E

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Restricted.  
Open.

HB

Draft.

Washington

Telegram.

No. 3195

(Date) March 20

Repeat to:—

U.K. Del. New York  
1236

H. Bealey 207/3

~~Ex-Clair~~  
~~Code~~  
Cypher.

Distribution:—

Dip Secret.

Copies to:—

[for the French  
in North  
Africa, Syria  
and Lebanon]

March, 1948  
CYIPHER 101

Despatched 2.16/0 M.

Most Immediate  
~~Top Secret~~

Addressed to Washington Telno 3195 of March 20  
Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York

New York telegram No. 908 to me.

The new American proposals for Palestine will be considered in Cabinet on Monday morning. It would be of great assistance to have by that time your appreciation of the reasons for the change in the attitude of the U.S. Govt. and for the adoption of their present line. I hope it will be possible, before you telegraph this appreciation, for a member of your staff to visit Henderson and obtain his views.

2. Have you any reason to suppose that before Senator Austin ~~had~~ spoke in the Security Council, the Americans had reached any understanding with either Arabs or Jews?

3. I have now received New York telegram No. 936. This will also have to be considered by the Cabinet, but at first sight I do not see how we could possibly agree to accept the part which it is suggested we should play in the proposed Trusteeship. Nor do I think the ~~French~~ French would agree, and in any event the return of the French to the Middle East would probably have disastrous repercussions in the Arab States, particularly ~~in~~ Syria and Lebanon. You should therefore try to ascertain what the next American proposal/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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proposal is likely to be if the French Govt. and H.M. Govt. decline to be associated in the provision of forces to support a Trusteeship.

~~I understand the Committee is  
every. I expect this is true of  
the present events not only  
his case has been  
regretted a full statement  
for us by Sunday as per~~

Y B

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Cypher /OTP

E

Top Secret

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 3195  
20th March, 1948

D. 2.16 p.m. 20th March, 1948

Repeated to New York (U.K. Delegation) No. 1236

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 3195 of 20th March repeated for information to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

New York telegram No. 908 to me.

The new American proposals for Palestine will be considered in Cabinet on Monday morning. It would be of great assistance to have by that time your appreciation of the reasons for the change in the attitude of the United States Government and for the adoption of their present line. I hope it will be possible, before you telegraph this appreciation, for a member of your staff to visit Henderson and obtain his views.

2. Have you any reason to suppose that before Senator Austin spoke in the Security Council, the Americans had reached any understanding with either Arabs or Jews?

3. I have now received New York telegram No. 936. This will also have to be considered by the Cabinet, but at first sight I do not see how we could possibly agree to accept the part which it is suggested we should play in the proposed Trusteeship. Nor do I think the French would agree, and in any event the return of the French to the Middle East would probably have disastrous repercussions in the Arab States, and particularly for the French in North Africa, Syria and Lebanon. You should therefore try to ascertain what the next American proposal is likely to be if the French Government and His Majesty's Government decline to be associated in the provision of forces to support a Trusteeship.

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1948

PALESTINE  
EASTERN

E3106 / G  
103

10

E 3106 / 103 8/10  
31/6  
Do to Bureau  
Washington  
1346  
(1350)  
(top secret)  
Dated 20 March

U.S. Policy to Palestine

Last Paper.

E3662

(Minutes.)

D. Balfour  
22/3

References.

E3662/1048/c  
E3631/4/31  
E3700/4/31

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8) Palestine Dir  
24 March  
Tel) W/ton 3381.  
Mar 26.  
Rpt  
U.K. Del. New York 1311  
Jerusalem.  
8) C.O.  
Tel) New York 1292 March  
3332.  
9) Action 25. (Index.)  
completed  
25/20/13  
Upt.

Next Paper.

Mr Lewis Jones rang me this afternoon, to say that Mr. Henderson had telephoned from Washington to ask whether H.M.G.'s policy was correctly represented by the reporting in the American press of the Secretary of State's speech on the Palestine Bill yesterday. This was to the effect that we had flatly rejected the new American proposal.

I explained to Mr. Lewis Jones why our public attitudes must remain inflexible and might therefore appear hostile to his Government's new approach. But I assured him that we appreciated and sympathised with its motives, and that we desired to keep in touch with the State Department.

This answer will be passed on to Mr. Henderson, but I do not think it reduces the necessity for a telegram in reply to the enclosed

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1 submit a draft.

H. Bealey 24/13

Tel. D. Wilson.

H. 73. 25/13

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En clair

E 2170

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

106

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE E 3726

Lord Inverchapel  
No. 1350

21st March, 1948

D. 11.40 a.m. 21st March, 1948  
R. 5.41 p.m. 21st March, 1948

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

MOST IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1350 of  
March 21st repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

My telegram No. 1346 paragraph 8 last sentence.

For "both Governments" read "British and French Govern-  
ments".

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DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel.  
No. 1346.

D. 10.19. p.m. 20th March  
1948.  
R. 5.10. a.m. 21st March  
1948.

20th March 1948.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York.

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 1346 of 20th March repeated United Kingdom Delegation New York for information.

Your telegram No. 3195.

Balfour this morning saw Henderson who, when asked why the United States Government had changed their attitude, at once replied that their policy had been perfectly logical. He pointed out that they had originally agreed to partition because it had seemed at the time to be the least unhappy solution and because, contrary to the view then expressed by His Majesty's Government, of which Balfour reminded him, they had assumed that this solution could be implemented without undue disturbance. Now that events had entirely disproved this hypothesis, it was obvious that some other solution had to be sought. It had in any case become perfectly clear that the implementation of partition by force would not obtain the requisite number of Security Council votes.

2. Henderson went on to say that, as the United States Government now saw it (before Austin had spoken they had not (repeat not) consulted either Arabs or Jews), a temporary trusteeship offered the only practical means of holding a situation which threatened the peace and stability of the entire Middle East. Although reminded by Balfour of the various considerations which have all along dictated our attitude and our time-table, Henderson then entered the most earnest plea that His Majesty's Government would at least refrain from rejecting out of hand the suggestion that they might assist in the preparation of a temporary trusteeship plan or the possibility of taking some eventual share in its implementation.

/3. Now that the United States

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Washington telegram No. 1346 to Foreign Office

-2-

3. Now that the United States Government had realised that partition was impracticable, it was surely, Henderson remarked, incumbent upon us both to leave nothing undone for the realisation of those long-term and most important aims on which a community of interest had been established between our two Governments in the talks last autumn. Should His Majesty's Government prove unable to come some way towards meeting the present United States move, he foresaw that, notwithstanding the initially favourable attitude at Lake Success of the French, Belgians, Chinese and Canadians, it might prove impossible to secure enough votes for the idea of a temporary trusteeship. In that event, he could see no other outcome in Palestine excepting conditions of chaos with all their repercussions elsewhere in the Middle East.

4. When Balfour invited him to explain on what lines he thought a temporary trusteeship could be established, Henderson said that, in their approach to this proposal, the United States Government had envisaged the following three possible forms of trusteeship:

(A) Trusteeship by a single power. This appeared to be quite out of the question. His Majesty's Government would obviously refuse to act in that capacity and with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, no other power, including the United States, would be ready to assume such a responsibility.

(B) Trusteeship by a small number of powers, e.g., Britain, the United States and one or two other powers, excluding the Soviet Union. The United States Government would not rule out such an arrangement if it should commend itself to other Governments.

(C) A United Nations trusteeship as outlined in New York telegram to you No. 936.

5. It was plain from what Henderson said that the preference of the United States Government lay with the last-named form of temporary trusteeship. Although he observed that the existence of a number of trustees would be liable to prove a source of weakness, he considered that this factor could be counteracted if the terms of the trusteeship were so drafted as to ensure that the widest possible powers were accorded to the Governor. He thought that the grant of virtually autonomous powers to the Governor was essential if internal order in Palestine were

/to be effectively

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to be effectively maintained. He was also of opinion that the terms of the trusteeship should omit features in the mandate which had so greatly complicated our task. Beyond mentioning immigration he did not enlarge on this head. Whilst endorsing points (A) to (F) of the above-mentioned New York telegram as representing the lines along which the United States Government were at present thinking, Henderson repeatedly emphasised that their minds were completely open to any alternative suggestions. The sole object on the United States Government was to start the ball rolling towards a fresh approach to the problem which they felt it their duty to do as they themselves had taken the initiative in the matter of partition.

6. Assuming that progress could be made along the lines adumbrated, Henderson confirmed the impression which Jebb had received from Rusk that the Americans hope to get a Governor installed by the 15th May. When Balfour pointed out that Cadogan had made it clear to Senator Austin that His Majesty's Government would not alter their dates of the 15th May and 1st August (see paragraph 5 of New York telegram to you No. 906), Henderson said that he fully recognised the considerations which had caused us to establish this time-table. At the same time, assuming that His Majesty's Government did not reject the temporary trusteeship proposal out of hand, he expressed the personal belief that it would be necessary to slow down the tempo of our withdrawal for a short period in order to enable the necessary arrangements to be made for the successful installation of the Governor. But Henderson was at pains to express the opinion that, in such an event, continued public adherence to our time-table would be most advisable from the point of view of keeping other powers aware of the need for the speediest possible action.

7. The talk then turned to the question of maintaining order if and when the suggested trusteeship were set up. Henderson here said that the United States Government would greatly appreciate His Majesty's Government's estimate of the security problem (see paragraph 10 of New York telegram to you No. 909). Balfour thereupon pointed out that it appeared to him exceedingly unlikely that a police force, however recruited, would suffice to keep the peace. In view of the severe losses which British security forces had sustained in the discharge

/of their duties, it was,

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Washington telegram No. 1346 to Foreign Office

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of their duties, it was, moreover, unthinkable that they should be left to bear this burden. Nor, even assuming the agreement of France, could he readily conceive that French troops could return to the Middle East without an explosion of Arab resentment.

8. Henderson replied to these remarks by once again referring to the new situation and to the wide international issues at stake. He said that the American suggestion for French military participation was purely tentative and would be withdrawn if it appeared impracticable on closer consideration. In so far as concerned the participation of British troops in a scheme of this kind, Henderson suggested that His Majesty's Government would have every right to make the concurrent use of American troops a sine qua non of their agreement.

<sup>British and French</sup>  
Henderson evidently had no clear idea as to what should be done were both Governments to decline to be associated in the provision of forces to support a trusteeship.

9. When Balfour asked whether the domestic situation in the United States would permit of the despatch of American troops to Palestine, Henderson said that, regardless of the objections which would undoubtedly be raised in many quarters, he believed that the Administration would be prepared to exercise its constitutional rights for the required purpose. In this connexion he expressed the opinion that, as an alternative to chaos in Palestine, such a course would eventually be approved even by Republicans like Senator Taft who were at present criticising the Administration's abandonment of partition. Whilst making it clear that he could not commit the Administration, he went so far as to imply that, situated as it was, the Administration was now disposed to deal with the Palestine problem without regard to the effect of its decisions upon electoral prospects.

10. Lastly, Henderson again voiced the earnest hope that Palestine could now be treated within the wider framework of securing British and American interests in the Middle East. Whilst fully recognising that the new American proposal raised very serious issues for His Majesty's Government, he did not despair that a further exchange of views between us might lead to a meeting of minds.

11. For comments, please see my immediately following telegram.

\*\*\*\*\*

See comment  
in tel. 1350

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~~TOP SECRET~~

H. B.

# CYPLNER

7 March, 1946

109

Despatched

M.

Draft.

WASHINGTON.

~~Most Immediate~~  
~~Top Secret~~

Telegram.

No. 3381

(Date) MARCH 25

Repeat to: -

U.K. Delegation,  
New York. 1311.  
Jerusalem.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*H. B. 25/3*

*J. B. 20.3*

~~Exhibit.~~

~~Index~~

Cypher.

Distribution: -

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*Sec. Secy*

*There will be a new*

*In paragraph 7 of your telegram under reference we are requested to estimate what forces would be necessary in case of conflict. This is a difficult question and we will try to provide as much information as possible. The situation will be different after the 15th May, because H.M.G. can accept no commitment after that date.*

Addressed to Washington Telegram No. 3381 of March 25 repeated for information to U.K. Delegation New York, and to Jerusalem.

Your telegram No. 1346.

PALESTINE.

Please express to Henderson our appreciation of the very full exposition of the new American policy which you were able to send after your conversation with him. You should also inform him of the substance of my telegram No. 1292 to Sir Alexander Cadogan. I realise that the ~~infinite~~ <sup>firm</sup> line which it is essential for us to hold, at least until our direct responsibility for Palestine is brought to an end on 15th May, may give rise to misunderstanding in Washington. It should not (repeat not) be inferred from this, however, that we are unsympathetic towards the intentions which have inspired the new American initiative. We fully recognise the importance of the Palestine issue in the context of the general interests of Britain and the United States in the Middle East.

2. Please also assure Henderson that my Department is, of course, ready at any time to exchange ideas with the State Department through one or both of the Embassies. ~~They are at present working on an answer to the~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~question raised in paragraph 7 of your~~ <sup>They</sup>

~~question raised in paragraph 7 of your telegram.~~ <sup>but we will try to provide as much information as possible. The situation will be different after the 15th May, because H.M.G. can accept no commitment after that date.</sup>

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~~telegram under reference.~~

3. I have now received Sir A. Cadogan's telegram No. 973; containing the suggestion that you should endeavour to elicit some further explanation of the American attitude in the light of the statement which the President is expected to give the press today. I would prefer you not (repeat not) to take the initiative in raising this subject. ~~If, however, it is raised by Henderson, and if it appears that the U.S. Government are in fact contemplating the recognition of a Jewish provisional Government in Palestine,~~ <sup>after the 15th May</sup> you should draw Henderson's attention to the probability that such a Government would not be able to control all the territory awarded to the Jews by the resolution of the General Assembly. You should then point out to him the embarrassment which might result from recognising a Jewish State in such a way as to imply at the same time recognition of a particular frontier which in practice would probably prove to be untenable.

~~But~~ If they ~~send for you~~  
(voluntarily) volunteered a statement to use  
Should like an opportunity  
of Courtesy if before  
replying

*[Signature]*

to you

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E5786/1078/G  
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DIPLOMATIC SECRET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 5581.

D: 6.25.p.m. March 25th, 1948.

March 25th, 1948.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York No. 1511.  
Jerusalem.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 5581 of March 25th, repeated for information to United Kingdom Delegation New York, and to Jerusalem.

Your telegram No. 1546.

PALESTINE.

Please express to Henderson our appreciation of the very full exposition of the new American policy which you were able to send after your conversation with him. You should also inform him of the substance of my telegram No. 1292 to Sir Alexander Cadogan. I realise that the firm line which it is essential for us to hold, at least until our direct responsibility for Palestine is brought to an end on 15th May, may give rise to misunderstanding in Washington. It should not (repeat not) be inferred from this, however, that we are unsympathetic towards the intentions which have inspired the new American initiative. We fully recognise the importance of the Palestine issue in the context of the general interests of Britain and the United States in the Middle East.

2. Please also assure Henderson that my Department is, of course, ready at any time to exchange ideas with the State Department through one or both of the Embassies. In paragraph 7 of your telegram under reference, we are requested to estimate what forces would be necessary in case of conflict. This is a difficult question but we will try to provide as much information as possible. There will be a new situation after the 15th May, because His Majesty's Government can accept no commitment after that date.

3. I have now received Sir A. Cadogan's telegram No. 973, containing the suggestion that you should endeavour to elicit some further explanation of the American attitude in the light of the statement which the President is expected to give the press today. I would prefer you not (repeat not) to take the initiative in raising this subject. If they volunteered a statement to you we should like an opportunity of considering it before replying.

---eOe---

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No. E 326/1078/5

March, 1948. 111

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HB

# CYPHER

Draft.

Despatched

M.

U.K. Del. New York

~~MOST IMMEDIATE~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Telegram.

No. 1292  
(Date) March 24

Addressed to U.K. Del. New York Telno. 1292  
*for information* of  
Repeated to Washington  
Jerusalem  
B.M.E.O. Cairo.

Repeat to :-

Washington telegram No. 1236.

Washington 3332

Jerusalem

B.M.E.O. Cairo

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The American appeal that we should support their new proposals on Palestine places us in a great difficulty. I sympathise with the motives which have led the U.S. Govt. to make this last minute effort to avert civil war in Palestine.

~~But I~~ But I feel that, for the time being at any rate, we must maintain our consistent line of abstention. The accusation has already been made, during last night's debate in the House of Commons on the Palestine Bill, that the new American move was concerted with H.M. Govt., and any support you gave to Austin in the Security Council would lend colour to this suspicion. For this reason I doubt whether our support would be helpful to the U.S. Govt. in dealing with their own public opinion.

2. Please speak to Senator Austin in the sense of paragraph 1 above. If you feel reasonably certain that the American proposals will/

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via G.O.

HB 24/3  
Cypher 24/3  
E. Chair.  
Code.  
Cypher.

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will obtain the necessary 7 votes without U.K. support, you might also point out to Austin that the result will be unaffected by our decision to abstain. For your own information, we have the following objections to voting in favour of the various parts of the new American proposal. Support for a truce might make it more difficult for us to resist appeals to leave British troops in Palestine as the instrument for maintaining the truce. Support for the trusteeship proposal, for suspending the activities of the Commission and for convening a special session would be interpreted as a vote against the Partition Plan, and consequently as a departure from our neutral position. You should therefore abstain from voting on all parts of any resolution based upon the American proposals as reported in your telegram No.908.

3. You should also know of two statements which I made in the House of Commons last night. ~~These are reported by the Times as follows:-~~

*We cannot be in the same position*  
 (1) ~~Britain could not be in the same position as the rest of the members of the United Nations until we are out of Palestine.~~ While ~~we still had troops there and were involved as we have been~~ *as any other member of the United Nations*

~~We do not occupy the same position. After May 15 other situations could and might arise, but at the moment he could not foresee the form. It was a fundamental position of British policy to be out.~~

~~The Government had stated all the way through that they would support anything which~~

~~we still had troops there and were involved as we have been~~  
~~We do not occupy the same position. After May 15 other situations could and might arise, but at the moment he could not foresee the form. It was a fundamental position of British policy to be out.~~  
~~The Government had stated all the way through that they would support anything which~~

*in being place in the administration, a very different situation can & may arise, but that is a matter that I cannot foresee at the moment. I do want to emphasize that we have to get into a position to enable us to be out of Palestine. That is the fundamental point of British policy.*

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on the one  
or the other..

112  
~~could~~ <sup>can</sup> be agreed between <sup>the</sup> Arabs and <sup>the</sup> Jews, but that they <sup>will</sup> ~~would~~ not take part in enforcing anything, whether <sup>a</sup> trusteeship or anything else."

4. You will have seen that the Jewish Agency have declared that a provisional Jewish Govt. will begin to function in Palestine not later than the 16th May. This Govt. will presumably claim to exercise authority over the whole area awarded to the Jews in the Resolution of the 29th November. Has this declaration affected the plans of the U.S. Delegation?

FD

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(345) Wt. 25800/149 100m. 1/48 A.O.S.

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DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION.

E.  
TOP SECRET.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 1292.

24th March, 1948.

D. 5.00 p.m. 24th March, 1948.

Repeated to Washington No. 5352  
Jerusalem  
B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 239.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 1292, repeated for information to Washington, Jerusalem, British Middle East Office Cairo.

Washington telegram No. 1346.

The American appeal that we should support their new proposals on Palestine places us in a great difficulty. I sympathise with the motives which have led the United States Government to make this last minute effort to avert civil war in Palestine. But I feel that, for the time being at any rate, we must maintain our consistent line of abstention. The accusation has already been made, during last night's debate in the House of Commons on the Palestine Bill, that the new American move was concerted with His Majesty's Government, and any support you gave to Austin in the Security Council would lend colour to this suspicion. For this reason I doubt whether our support would be helpful to the United States Government in dealing with their own public opinion.

2. Please speak to Senator Austin in the sense of paragraph 1 above. If you feel reasonably certain that the American proposals will obtain the necessary 7 votes without United Kingdom support, you might also point out to Austin that the result will be unaffected by our decision to abstain. For your own information, we have the following objections to voting in favour of the various parts of the new American proposal. Support for a truce might make it more difficult for us to resist appeals to leave British troops in Palestine as the instrument for maintaining the truce. Support for the trusteeship proposal, for suspending the activities of the Commission and for convening a special session would be interpreted as a vote against the Partition Plan, and consequently as a departure from our neutral position. You should therefore abstain from voting on all parts of any resolution based upon the American proposals as reported in your telegram No. 908.

/3. You should also

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New York (U.K. Delegation) telegram No. 1292  
to Foreign Office.

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3. You should also know of two statements which I made in the House of Commons last night.

(1) "We cannot be in the same position as the rest of the members of the United Nations until we are out of Palestine. While we have troops there, while we are there, involved as we have been, we do not get the same position as any other member of the United Nations. After May 15th and we are out, and the transition is taking place in the administration, a very different situation can and may arise, but that is a matter that I cannot foresee at the moment. I do want to emphasise that we have to get into a position to enable us to be out of Palestine. That is the fundamental point of British policy".

(2) "His Majesty's Government have stated all the way through that they will support anything which can be agreed between the Arabs and the Jews, but that they will not take part in enforcing anything, whether a trusteeship or anything else, on the one or the other".

4. You will have seen that the Jewish Agency have declared that a provisional Jewish Government will begin to function in Palestine not later than the 16th May. This Government will presumably claim to exercise authority over the whole area awarded to the Jews in the Resolution of the 29th November. Has this declaration affected the plans of the United States Delegation?

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PALESTINE  
EASTERN

E3727/G  
22 MAR 1948 115

E3727/1048/31/G

Palestine : New U. S. policy

Lora Swerchop  
Washington  
1347  
(top cover)  
Dated 20 March

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

(E3726)

J. Balfour  
22/3

References.

W3. 22/3

(Print.)

(A) UK Del NEW YORK (Philip Noel Baker) to GRADWYN JETS 23 March 1948

(How disposed of.)

2) For. Sec  
24 March

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

25 20/3

W.P.

Next Paper.

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E372/1018/9.

30 MAR 1948

SECRETARY OF STATE.

CIRCULATION OF PALESTINE TELEGRAMS.

*correctly*

You enquired yesterday why the Colonial Secretary and the Minister of State had not received copies of Washington telegrams Nos. 1346 and 1347 about Palestine. These telegrams were marked Top Secret and were therefore given Diplomatic Secret Distribution by Communications Department. This is a very restricted distribution which does not go automatically to the Colonial Secretary, and Communications Department cannot send them to the Colonial Secretary without specific authorisation in each case from the Department concerned, which for Palestine is the Eastern Department. Eastern Department were under the mistaken impression that these telegrams would go automatically to the Colonial Secretary, and therefore did not give the requisite instructions on Sunday. They will do so in future. There may be occasions when there is no one in Eastern Department on duty, and instructions have been issued to the Resident Clerk to ensure that on these occasions Diplomatic Secret telegrams on Palestine shall be sent forthwith to the Colonial Secretary.

The Minister of State receives Diplomatic Secret telegrams in the same way as you do, and his Private Secretaries normally make arrangements for getting them to him rapidly in cases of urgency.

*John. Humber*  
23rd March, 1948.

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET DISTRIBUTIONFROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel

No. 1347

20th March, 1948.

D. 9.20 p.m. 20th March, 1948.

R. 3.50 a.m. 21st March, 1948.

Repeated to New York (U.K. Del.)

MOST IMMEDIATETOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1347 of March 20th repeated for information to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

My immediately preceding telegram.

In amplification of what Henderson told Balfour about the motive for the new American move, it would appear, as seen from here, that the Administration has been mainly actuated by the following considerations: in the first place I think that there can be no doubt that, confronted with a rapidly deteriorating international situation, the President and the Secretary of State have felt constrained to give greater weight to the views of the Secretary of Defence and of the Chiefs of Staff. These advisers have all along been very conscious of the strategic consequences of partition to the United States in the event of Arab opposition on a scale which would necessitate the use of international force. In particular they have been increasingly obsessed by the danger of allowing any opening for the entry of Soviet forces into a key area of the Middle East abutting on the Mediterranean.

2. Secondly, now that events have falsified the easy assumption that partition could be peacefully implemented, it has presumably become apparent to the President and his political advisers that the pro-Zionists can only be conciliated at the price of losing the support of an even greater number of voters who would certainly react most vehemently against any shedding of American blood in a Jewish cause. In these circumstances, the Administration can now hope to derive no electoral profit from the Palestine imbroglio, excepting insofar as it is able to demonstrate to the public a single-minded devotion to the national interests.

3. Thirdly, in the light of the fact that even many loyal democrats now despair of his re-election, the President himself may well have lost patience with all domestic pressures and arguments which have hitherto militated against

/the assessment of the

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the assessment of the Palestine problem on its own merits. Indirect evidence of this is to be found in the visible relief which Mr. Truman displayed when, during the course of his speech at the St. Patrick's Day dinner in New York this week, he roundly declared that it was better to court defeat than to pay the price of conciliating "Henry Wallace and his Communists".

4. In all the circumstances I think it proper to suggest that, out of its very electoral weakness, the Administration is now deriving a new-found independence of judgment on this particular issue. I do not myself think that, whatever may have been its motives on earlier occasions, the Administration is now seeking to relieve its own embarrassments at our expense.

5. For what it is worth I might add that, in his talk with Balfour, Henderson expressed the belief that the Administration would pursue its proposals whatever the Congressional and public clamour. Judging from initial comment, which is mostly adverse to the Administration it looks as though criticism will be concentrated on the vacillations in United States policy rather than on the actual proposals now adumbrated.

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TOP SECRET

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United Kingdom Delegation  
to the United Nations,  
New York.

23rd March, 1948.

My dear Gladwyn,

I see from Washington telegram No. 176 to New York, dated March 20th, that Loy Henderson has told Jock Balfour that the U.S. Government are now almost certainly ready to use American troops in Palestine. This, no doubt, is, in their view, an enormous step in advance. Of course, they are only moved to it by their desire to stop the establishment of a Russian centre in the Middle East, and it is on the basis of our "common interests" in that area that they appeal to us to help.

This argument applies with even greater urgency to Greece. If Greece falls to Russia, as is quite possible, Palestine will really matter very little. The Russians will all too probably get Turkey and will have their flank protected for whatever they desire to do in Iraq, Iran and Palestine. If Greece had fallen to Mussolini in October 1940, it is more than doubtful whether we could have held Egypt, and it is quite  
/certain

H. M. Gladwyn Jebb, Esq., C.B., C.M.G.

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1948

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PALESTINE

31 MAR 1948

Registry Number E4046/1078/31

FROM Chancery  
WASHINGTON  
No. 1219/2/48

Dated 22nd March  
Received 31st "  
in Registry

Palestine, Statement by Mr. Marshall.

Encloses full text of the remarks made by Mr Marshall at Los Angeles on March 20th of which a summary was contained in Washington telegram No 1351 (E3739/1078/31) dated March 21st.

Last Paper.

3993

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

N.A. Dupre  
5/4

D. Balfour  
3/3

H.B. 1/4

(Action completed.)

J.E.V. 5/4

(Index.)

[Handwritten marks]

Next Paper.

4790

[26513 F.O.P.]

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Reference:-  
**FO 371 / 68648**

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E 121

BRITISH EMBASSY.  
WASHINGTON 8. D. C.

22nd March, 1948.

Ref: 1219/2/48

E 4046  
7 MAR 1948

Dear Department,

We enclose herein the full text of the remarks on Palestine made by Mr. Marshall at Los Angeles on March 20th of which a summary was contained in our telegram No. 1351 of the 21st March.

We are sending copies of this letter and of its enclosure to the United Kingdom Delegation, New York, and to Jerusalem.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W. 1.

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E 4790 122

1948

PALESTINE

19 APR 1948

Registry Number E4790/1078/31

TELEGRAM FROM Lord Inverchapel No. WASHINGTON 1865

Dated 17th April Received in Registry 19th

Palestine Situation, United States Views.

Lord Inverchapel reviews the United States attitude towards the Palestine Problem. The position is that they want Anglo-American co-operation in finding a solution. As they see it, the last remaining hope for avoiding chaos in Palestine and the Middle East lies in a supreme effort to adjust British and American points of view and to exert a joint influence over a rapidly deteriorating situation.

Refers Foreign Office telegram No, 1527 dated to New York (E4796/1078/6).

Last Paper.

4046

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

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(Index.)

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Next Paper.

4791

(Minutes.)

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D. Malpin 21/4

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Telegram No. 1865 from Washington to Foreign Office

- 2 -

treatment of the problem in the context of larger Anglo-American interests in the Middle East, the Administration is entitled to the constructive assistance of its British partner. As they see it, the last remaining hope for avoiding spreading chaos in Palestine with all its repercussions throughout the Middle East and the Mediterranean littoral, lies in a supreme effort to adjust our respective points of view and to exert our joint influence on a rapidly deteriorating situation.

3. If circumstances do not admit of some positive response on the part of His Majesty's Government the above-mentioned disappointment of the United States officials concerned will be accentuated to a point where it can no longer be concealed from Congressmen and journalists. In that event public criticism here which has of late been primarily directed against the United States Government will almost certainly once again vent itself as much if not more on His Majesty's Government. Indeed, we must in any circumstances reckon with the possibility that as the retiring mandatory we shall find ourselves, however unjustly, saddled with the major public responsibility for the further convulsions in Palestine which must ensue if the United Nations proves unable to devise means of filling the vacuum after the 15th May.

4. In all our talks we have naturally been at pains to remind State Department officials of the strength and unity of public feeling in Britain on this issue as a result of our heavy casualties and sacrifices and to recall how much Britain's difficulties as the mandatory power have been aggravated by the irresponsible back-seat driving of the United States Administration, Congress and public opinion. But whilst frankly admitting the justice of our reproaches they have equally been at pains to plead with us to let bygones be bygones both in view of the wider international issues involved and of the fact that the Administration is at length ready to assume its fair share of responsibility at the wheel. They are moreover concerned to emphasise that in the light of this last-named consideration a new situation has arisen in which it is open to our two Governments to apply to Palestine the same intimate and equal collaboration which it has proved possible for us to establish in other fields. Conversely, they foresee that if through the absence of

such collaboration/

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Telegram No. 1865 from Washington to Foreign Office

- 3 -

such collaboration the United Nations fails to devise some means of ameliorating the Palestine situation, the repercussions will be such as to impose a severe strain upon Anglo-American partnership in other contexts.

5. All that has occurred in the interval has served to confirm the belief expressed in the fourth paragraph of my telegram No. 1347 that the Administration is not now seeking to relieve its own embarrassment at our expense. Indeed to judge from their talks with members of my staff (see my immediately following telegram) responsible officials are almost pitifully anxious to ensure that the Palestine problem is handled in such a way as to serve Anglo-American strategic interests in the Middle East and to avoid any strain on our partnership in wider fields.

6. It is of course true that the Soviet menace constitutes a limiting factor on such damage as might be inflicted upon Anglo-American collaboration as a result of acute disagreement on the Palestine issue. But the basic need to ensure that this collaboration remains unshaken would seem to call for some positive recognition on our part of the altered American role. It is perhaps pertinent to recall here that the eighth paragraph of my telegram No. 1346 recorded a suggestion of Henderson's that His Majesty's Government would have every right to make the concurrent use of American troops a sine qua non of their agreement to the United States proposals. Should it nevertheless prove impossible for us to accede to the current suggestions of the United States Government ought we not at least to put forward for their private consideration if you will our own ideas as to how the situation can now be handled with the minimum of detriment to our respective interests.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat]

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel  
No. 1866  
17th April, 1948

D. 6.14 p.m. 17th April, 1948  
R. 12.30 a.m. 18th April, 1948

Repeated to New York (U.K. Delegation)

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

E 4791

19 APR 1948

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1866 of 17th April repeated for information to U.K. Delegation New York.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Palestine.

Following from Balfour for Wright.

In amplification of the views expressed in the above-mentioned telegram it may interest you to learn that Henderson yesterday told Allen that he had just received Douglas' account of the Secretary of State's initial reaction to the United States communication contained in your telegram under reference which he found very disappointing. He had no instructions to speak to us and spoke on his own responsibility but his personal view was that your attitude would be very difficult to explain to public opinion in the United States. When it became known it would create a strongly unfavourable reaction here which would have repercussions on Anglo-American cooperation throughout the world.

2. Henderson said that as we knew he had been working for closer cooperation in the Middle East and with some success. But if we washed our hands of the situation in Palestine, Anglo-American cooperation in that area would as foreseen in the talks last autumn be rendered quite impossible. In addition, he personally felt that things would inevitably become more difficult for those who favour the closest possible United States cooperation with the United Kingdom on Western Union and like matters. In saying this he stressed that the twelfth point in the United

States communication/

19 APR 1948  
RECEIVED  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
LONDON

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129

E 3739

20 MAR 1948

PALESTINE

Registry Number E3739/1078/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No. Lord Inverchapel WASHINGTON

Dated 1351

Received in Registry 21st March 22nd "

Palestine, United States Attitude.

Transmits text of statement on Palestine made by Marshall at Press Conference in Los Angeles on March 20th. He said "Course of action proposed by Austin appeared to me after careful consideration to be wisest. I recommend it to the President who accepted it."

Last Paper.

3727

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

W. H. Luskon. CO  
A. H. Luskon. CO  
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M. J. ?  
M. O. S.  
Adams  
A. W.  
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(Action completed.)

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J. C. 20/3

(In k.)

[Handwritten initials]

Next Paper.

E3819

(Minutes.)

*D. Balfour 22/3*  
The U.S. government are seeking to show - no doubt justifiably - that they could not have obtained a majority on the Security Council for implementing partition.

*N.A. D. 20/3*

*W. B. 22/3*

*In P.P. W. H. Luskon. CO (American Embassy) L. W. Wright 23/3*  
*U.S. 31/3*

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E.130

En Clair

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Inverchapel  
No. 1551

D. 4.20 p.m. 21st March 1948  
R.10.35 p.m. 21st March 1948

21st March 1948.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York

IMMEDIATE.

E 3739  
22 MAR 1948

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1551 of March 21st repeated for information to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

Following is summary of statement on Palestine made by Marshall at a Press Conference in Los Angeles on 20th March.

[Begins.]

Course of action proposed by Austin appeared to me after careful consideration to be wisest. I recommended it to the President who accepted it.

2. Overriding consideration in Palestine situation is need to maintain peace after Mandate's end. We believe the United Nations should do everything possible to bring fighting to an end and save lives which would be lost following British withdrawal. Grave international situation outlined by President in his recent message to Congress further emphasises compelling importance of preventing outbreak of open warfare in Palestine. United States interest in peaceful Palestine settlement arises not only out of deep humanitarian considerations but also out of vital elements of our national security.

3. United States supported partition plan last autumn. Since then we have explored possibility of a peaceful implementation of that plan. We sought to have Security Council accept plan as basis for its own action. This it refused to do on 5th March. Our subsequent attempt to find through consultation between five principal powers some basis for agreement by which partition could proceed peacefully was also unsuccessful. Nor was it possible to develop any measure of agreement between Palestinian Arabs and Jews or any substantial agreement among the permanent members as to how the Security Council should proceed. Informal consultations with other members of Council have made it clear that Security Council would not now pass a resolution to proceed with partition. In addition to efforts within the United Nations we have tried by diplomatic means, but without success,

/to obtain wider degree...

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Washington telegram No. 1351 to Foreign Office.

2.

to obtain a wider degree of acceptance for the General Assembly's recommendations.

4. We are therefore faced with position that Mandate will end on 15th May and that no successor Government will be in a position on that date to maintain law and order. A truce is essential and a military truce cannot now be achieved without a political truce. But the latter will bring us to 15th March [sic] without elementary arrangements for keeping order in that situation.

5. United States suggestion is that a temporary trusteeship should be established to maintain peace and open way for an agreed settlement. It could be ended as soon as a peaceful solution can be found and it would be established without prejudice in any way to eventual political settlement which might be found. United States has repeatedly stated that we are seeking Palestine solution within United Nations framework and that we are not going to act unilaterally in that matter. Proposal for temporary United Nations trusteeship, without prejudice to ultimate solution, is only suggestion thus far presented which appears to offer any basis for action by the United Nations to meet the existing situation in Palestine.

[Encs].

Full text follows by bag.

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G. LEWIS JONES  
AMERICAN EMBASSY  
1 GROSVENOR SQUARE  
LONDON, W. 1

INDEXED 132E

March 23 mllr

Dear Michael,

So much crosses your desk that you  
have missed this part of the Embassy's Radio  
Bulletin of yesterday. I found Mr Marshall's statement  
of great interest.

E 3955

yours  
Lewis

mllr  
24.3

Mr. Buchanan

30 MAR 1948

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~~"The Government of Czechoslovakia has informed this Government that on March 20, 1948, it intends to sign the protocol of provisional application of the general agreement on tariffs and trade and to put the agreement provisionally into effect on April 20, 1948.~~

~~"The United States Government is examining the implications and obligations of the agreement in the light of the recent developments in Czechoslovakia."~~

MR. MARSHALL EXPLAINS PALESTINE ACTION

LOS ANGELES — The following statement was made by Secretary of State George C. Marshall at a press conference in Los Angeles on March 20:

"The position of the United States on Palestine was stated by Ambassador Austin in the Security Council on Friday (March 19.)

"The course of action with respect to the Palestine question which was proposed yesterday (March 19) by Ambassador Austin appeared to me, after the most careful consideration, to be the wisest course to follow. I recommended it to the President and he approved my recommendation.

"The primary and overriding consideration in that situation is the need to maintain the peace and to prevent chaos and widespread disorder upon the termination of the mandate on May 15, 1948. We believe that the United Nations should do everything it can to bring the fighting to an end and save the lives of the men, women, and children which would be lost in the bitter fighting which would otherwise be expected to follow the withdrawal of British troops.

"The grave international situation which the President described in his message to the Congress on March 17 further emphasizes the compelling importance of preventing the outbreak of open warfare in Palestine. The interest of the United States in a peaceful settlement in Palestine arises not only out of deep humanitarian considerations but also out of vital elements of our national security.

"The United States supported partition plan for Palestine in the General Assembly last Autumn.

"Since that time we have explored every possibility of a peaceful implementation of that recommendation. We sought to have the Security Council accept the plan as a basis for its own action in the matter. This it refused to do on March 5, 1948. We then sought to find through consultations among the five principal powers some basis of agreement on which the partition plan might go forward by peaceful means. These consultations were unsuccessful in developing any measure of agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine or any substantial agreement among the permanent members as to how the Security Council might proceed. Informal consultations with other members of the Council have made it clear that the Security Council would not now pass a resolution to proceed with partition. In addition to efforts within the United Nations we have attempted by diplomatic means to obtain a wider degree of acceptance of the recommendation of the General Assembly. These efforts did not lead to any substantial result.

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"We are faced, therefore, with the prospect that the United Kingdom will abandon the mandate of Palestine on May 15, 1948, and that no successor government will be in a position on that date to maintain law and order.

"A truce is essential. A military truce cannot be achieved under existing circumstances without a parallel truce in the political field. A political truce, however, would bring us up to May 15 without elementary arrangements for keeping order in that situation.

"The United States suggestion is that a temporary trusteeship should be established in order to maintain the peace and to open up the way to an agreed settlement. This trusteeship could be ended as soon as a peaceful solution can be found. The trusteeship itself would be established without prejudice in any way to the eventual political settlement which might be reached for Palestine.

"The United States has repeatedly stated that we are seeking a solution for Palestine within the framework of the United Nations and that we are not going to act unilaterally in that matter. The proposal for a temporary United Nations trusteeship, without prejudice to the ultimate solution, made by this Government, is the only suggestion thus far presented which appears to offer any basis for action by the United Nations to meet the existing situation in Palestine

-----

SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER U.S. PALESTINE PROPOSAL

TAKE SUCCESS -- The United Nations Security Council will resume discussion of the Palestine question on March 24, with the U.S. proposal for a temporary U.N. trusteeship for Palestine up for debate.

The Council adjourned on March 19 shortly after the U.S. delegate, Mr. Warren R. Austin, made the U.S. suggestion, which also included a request for an immediate special session of the U.N. General Assembly to consider the trusteeship recommendation, and the proposal that the Council instruct the U.N. Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to carry out the partition plan recommended by the General Assembly.

Mr. Austin presented the U.S. plan as the only way likely to avoid an outbreak of heavy fighting in Palestine when the British surrender their mandate on May 15.

"There seems to be general agreement that the (partition) plan cannot now be implemented by peaceful means," he said. "We believe that further steps must be taken immediately not only to maintain the peace but also to afford a further opportunity to reach an agreement between the interested parties regarding the future government of Palestine."

The temporary trusteeship proposed by the United States, Mr. Austin said, "would be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned or to the character of eventual political settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay."

The draft resolutions to give effect to the U.S. proposals will be circulated among Security Council members, Mr. Austin said.

(more)

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After Mr. Austin presented the proposals to an afternoon meeting of the Council on March 19, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, spokesman for the Jewish Agency for Palestine, denounced the statement as a "shocking reversal" of the previous U.S. position, and asserted that the partition decision of the General Assembly "remains valid for the Jewish people."

"Any proposals calling for further sacrifices will have to be imposed upon the Jewish community in Palestine by force," Dr. Silver said in his statement, also made before the Security Council. "If the United Nations Commission is unable to carry out the mandates which were assigned to it by the General Assembly, the Jewish people of Palestine will move forward in the spirit of that resolution and will do everything which is dictated by considerations of national survival and by considerations of justice and historic rights."

Soviet delegate Gromyko also disagreed with the U.S. proposal, saying the Soviet Union "cannot accept this position. Certainly it cannot be said that there is general agreement as regards this proposition."

EGYPT GETS EXPORT IMPORT BANK LOAN

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Export-Import Bank has announced a credit of 5,600,000 dollars to Egyptian Fertilizer and Chemical Industries, Inc., for use in building a calcium nitrate fertilizer plant near Suez. The total cost of the plant will be between 19,000,000 dollars and 20,000,000 dollars.

The Chemical Construction Corporation, a private U.S. concern, will design and supervise the project and some of the equipment will be bought in Great Britain. The plant will relieve a serious shortage of fertilizer in Egypt.

U.S. ASKS SOVIETS ABOUT RADIO INTERFERENCE

WASHINGTON -- The State Department has instructed Ambassador W. Bedell Smith to ask the Soviet Government for "effective remedial measures" against jamming of the Voice of America broadcasts to the Far East, the Department's Press Officer, Mr. Michael J. McDermott told newsmen on March 20.

It has been reported from Manila that U.S. broadcasts relayed from there have been "blacked out" during the past several weeks, possibly by radio transmitters.

The State Department announcement said:

"Since the end of February, reports have been reaching the Department of unusual interference in its radio relay of Voice of America broadcasts in that (Far Eastern) area. These reports indicate that the interference is concentrated during the period when the Department's relay system is carrying a Russian language programme beamed to the Far East over its Manila and Honolulu relay stations.

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1948

PALESTINE

E 3819

24 MAR 1948

Registry Number | E3819/1078/31

TELEGRAM FROM  
Lord Inverchapel  
No. WASHINGTON  
1365

Dated

Received in Registry | 22nd March  
24th "United States Palestine Policy.

Refers Washington telegram No, 1347, (E3727/1078/G)  
Transmits gist of American Press and wireless comment  
on the change of policy towards Palestine.  
Comment generally criticises the Governments action  
for various reasons.

Last Paper.

3739

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

S. W. Watson 8/1  
R. Lerman 10/6/48  
Scherr 7/15  
M. J. Sa  
M. O. 4  
Adm. 1/1  
Mar 24

(Action  
completed.)

(Index)

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10/2/48

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3888

(Minutes.)

B. P. 2/3

H. B. 26/3

New York  
UN (C) Dept.  
N. A. Dept. 11/3/4

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1948

PALESTINE

E 3819

24 MAR 1948

Registry Number E3819/1078/31

TELEGRAM FROM  
Lord Inverchapel  
No. WASHINGTON  
1365

Dated

Received in Registry } 22nd March  
24th "United States Palestine Policy.Refers Washington telegram No, 1347, (E3727/1078/G)  
Transmits gist of American Press and wireless comment  
on the change of policy towards Palestine.  
Comment generally criticises the Governments action  
for various reasons.

Last Paper.

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Mar 24

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M. J. / 1/4

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3888

(Minutes.)

P. Balfour  
25/3

H.B. 26/3

New York  
UN (C) Dept.  
N.A. Paper  
113/4

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5. One or two observers are dismayed that, like American actions in other international fields, the present decision appears to have been dictated by the Soviet threat. But majority opinion shares the administration's fears. The change of policy towards Palestine has naturally been related to the Trieste declaration and some commentators are pointing out that the President must [grp. undec. ? indeed] be very concerned about the international situation to acquiesce in an act so hazardous for his political future. The stream of abuse heaped on military leaders, and particularly on Forrestal, the Secretary of National Defence, has to some extent been diverted on to the Administration as a whole as a result of Mr. Marshall's public announcement that he had advised the President to take this decision.

6. Comment is less concerned with the merits of the new American proposal. But such views as have been expressed are not very favourable. It is not believed that the change brings the Palestine question any nearer to solution, particularly as the Trusteeship arrangement will presumably require an international force of some sort. American responsibility for trusteeship is thought to be even greater than it would have been for partition. The Baltimore Sun is amongst those who speculate whether the Arabs may have exacted a reversal of American policy as the price for a truce. It considers such a price high in terms of national prestige but declares that "if it results in cessation of fighting and the continuing of negotiations, maybe it is not too much to pay".

7. A number of the more responsible newspapers outside New York commend the Administration for having frankly admitted a mistake and for doing its belated best to rectify an impossible situation. In the words of the Washington Star, "the administration must be credited with acting in the best interests of the nation and ignoring domestic political considerations". The feeling that the United States has at last awakened to the reality of the situation is undoubtedly much more widespread in non-Zionist circles than press and wireless opinion would lead one to believe. In contrast to the newspaper P.M. which critically remarked that the new policy "brings the Truman doctrine to the Middle East", many Americans are relieved that this should be so.

8. This development has for the time being served to divert criticism from Britain's role in Palestine. In fact some Left-Wing commentators contrast our consistent determination to have nothing to do with the enforcement of partition with what they regard as American duplicity. In this connexion it is suggested that our hands-off policy applied only to the partition plan and that in the changed circumstances we may be willing to play a more positive part in the future of Palestine. Non-Zionists at any rate appear to hope that this will prove to be the case.

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PALESTINE  
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F.O. Minute  
dated 20 March

U.S. Policy in Palestine

Last Paper  
E3427

(Minutes)

References

See within  
1. W'lon 1334  
2. W'lon 1345  
20 March  
20 March  
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H.B. 25/3

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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*E3838*

24 MAR 1948

Cypher/OTP

PRISEC

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 3203

D. 4.15 p.m. 20th March 1948

20th March 1948

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

DEDIP

Following personal for Balfour from Private Secretary.

Secretary of State is most anxious you should get a full statement to him by Sunday night. He was sorry to hear that the Ambassador, Marshall and Lovett were all out of Washington, in view of present rapid development of events in Palestine and elsewhere.

ccc

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EN CLAIR

P R I S E C

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel  
No: 1334

D.12.8.p.m. 20th March  
1948

20th March 1948

R.6.17.p.m. 20th March  
1948

MOST IMMEDIATE

Your telegram 3203.

Following personal for Private  
Secretary from Balfour.

Am assuming that your request  
for a statement refers to your telegram 3195.

X:X:X:

*1/29*

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Cypher/OTP

P R I S E C

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel.  
No. 1345.

20th March 1948.

D. 8.26. p.m.  
20th March 1948.  
R. 2.31. a.m.  
21st March 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Following from Ambassador for Private Secretary.

Your telegram No. 3203. Palestine.

Marshall and Lovett are still away but I have returned to Washington. Comments on Palestine situation are contained in my two immediately following telegrams.

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13 1948

PALESTINE

EASTERN

E3883 /G

142

E 3883/1048/31/G

U.K. doc<sup>n</sup>

New York

943

Top Secret

Dated 24 March

U.S. policy to Palestine

Last Paper.

E 3838

(Minutes.)

References.

E 3426/1048/G

E 3400/4/31

HB. 27/3

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>

Next Paper.

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC(SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 973

D. 8.20 p.m. 24th March, 1948.

24th March, 1948.

R. 2.46 a.m. 25th March, 1948.

Repeated to: Washington  
Jerusalem.

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET  
LIGHT

E/G

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 973 of March 24th, repeated for information to Washington and Jerusalem.

Your telegram No. 1292; Palestine.

I conveyed gist of paragraph 1 of your telegram to Austin at the beginning of this morning's Security Council meeting reported in my immediately preceding telegram. I did not (repeat not) speak on lines of second sentence of paragraph 2 since it seemed far from clear that United States proposal would in fact receive seven votes. Subsequent proceedings did nothing to remove doubts on this score.

2. As you will have seen, Austin did not at the meeting introduce any formal resolutions to give effect to trusteeship proposal, and most significant passage of the meeting was perhaps Silver's remark to the effect that he hoped for the privilege of commenting on such resolutions if and when they were presented. Background of this, according to London "Times" representative here, is that Jewish leaders yesterday succeeded in seeing President Truman and demanded that United States Government reverse its stand. After unsuccessfully trying to persuade them that new United States proposals did not mean abandonment of partition, President apparently referred them to a press statement which he is to make tomorrow and in the meantime undertook that United States representative would take no action in the Security Council.

3. It seems possible from the foregoing and from a report in to-day's "New York Times" that United States Government are contemplating a further shift of ground which might involve e.g. recognition of Jewish Provisional Government (paragraph 4 of your telegram under reference). In view of repeated United States requests for our co-operation on trusteeship plan (my telegram No. 936 - paragraph 2 and Washington telegram No. 1346 paragraph 10), His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington might, if you see

/no objection, endeavour...

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**From New York 12/20/48 No. 371 to Jerusalem Office**

1144

- 2 -

no objection, endeavour to elicit some explanation of their attitude in the light of President's statement tomorrow.

Please repeat to Jerusalem Important as my telegram No. 241.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat]

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**FO 371 / 68648**

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**E**

1165

E 3900

1948

PALESTINE

26 JAN 1948

Registry Number } E3900/1078/31

**TELEGRAM FROM**  
 Lord Inverchapel  
 Washington  
 No. 1440

Dated 25.3.48

Received in Registry } 26.3.48

**U.S. attitude - Palestine question**  
 Refers to New York telegram No.973 of 24th March (E3883/1078/G). Quotes text of statement on Palestine made by President Truman to press conference on 25th March. President also answered questions pledging American support for the trusteeship. Repeated to Jerusalem and New York.

Last Paper.  
 83883

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index)

*[Handwritten signatures]*

Next Paper.  
 E 3907

(Minutes.)

This telegram does not fully report the President's answers to supplementary questions. According to the Times, he said:

(i) the statement was intended to make clear his continued belief in partition at some time in the future;

(ii) he had not changed his mind about the desirability of additional immigration.

The statement itself was carefully drafted, and if the President had refused to interpret it might have done no harm. The Arabs, however, will now read into it - and into an American resolution in the Security Council in favour of a trusteeship - the opinions expressed at (i) and (ii) above. I should think, therefore, that the President has destroyed the possibility of Arab cooperation in discussions on the basis of trusteeship.

N.A. Dyer  
 UN. (Political) Dept.  
 No. 2477/717 17505 15 F.O.P.

H. Beely 27/3  
*[Handwritten initials]*  
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En Clair

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

E146

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel D. 2.45 p.m. 25th March, 1948  
No. 1440

25th March, 1948

R. 9.19 p.m. 25th March, 1948

3000

Repeated Jerusalem,

United Kingdom Delegation New York Saving 26 MAR 1948

IMMEDIATE

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 1440 of 25th March, repeated Jerusalem and Saving to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram to you No. 973.

Following is text of statement on Palestine made by President Truman at a press conference this morning.

[Begins].

It is vital that the American people have a clear understanding of the position of the United States in the United Nations regarding Palestine.

This country vigorously supported the plan for partition with economic union recommended by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and by the General Assembly. We have explored every possibility consistent with the basic principles of the charter for giving effect to that solution. Unfortunately it has become clear that the partition plan cannot be carried out at this time by peaceful means. We could not undertake to impose this solution on the people of Palestine by the use of American troops both on charter grounds and as a matter of national policy.

The United Kingdom has announced its firm intention to abandon its mandate in Palestine on May 15th. Unless emergency action is taken, there will be no public authority in Palestine on that date capable of preserving law and order. Violence and bloodshed will descend upon the Holy Land. Large scale fighting among the people of that country will be the inevitable result. Such fighting would infect the entire Middle East and could lead to consequences of the gravest sort involving the peace of this nation and of the world.

These dangers are imminent, responsible Governments in the United Nations cannot face this prospect without acting promptly to prevent it. The United States has proposed to the Security Council a temporary United Nations trusteeship for Palestine to provide a Government to keep the peace. Such trusteeship was proposed only after we had exhausted every effort to find a way to carry out partition by peaceful means. Trusteeship is not proposed as a substitute for the partition plan, but as an effort to fill the vacuum soon to be created by the termination of the mandate on May 15th. The trusteeship does not prejudice the character of the final political settlement. It would establish the conditions of order which are essential to a peaceful solution.

If we are to aver



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(2)

If we are to avert tragedy in Palestine an immediate truce must be reached between the Arabs and Jews of that country. I am instructing Ambassador Austin to urge upon the Security Council in the strongest terms that representatives of the Arabs and Jews be called at once to the Council table to arrange such a truce.

The United States is prepared to lend every appropriate assistance to the United Nations in preventing bloodshed and in reaching a peaceful settlement. If the United Nations agrees to a temporary trusteeship, we must take our share of the necessary responsibility. Our regard for the United Nations for the peace of the world and for our own self interest does not permit us to do less.

With such a truce and such a trusteeship a peaceful settlement is yet possible. Without them open warfare is just over the horizon. American policy, in this emergency period is based squarely upon the recognition of this inescapable fact.

[Ends]

2. According to agency reports President made following points in answer to subsequent questions. He still hoped for partition later but regarded trusteeship as an essential piece of machinery. He repeatedly pledged American support for the trusteeship, but just as repeatedly said that this would not necessarily involve the use of American troops since it would not necessarily have to be imposed by force. When asked what was the alternative if other nations refused to support the proposal, he replied that he could not say, but added that the only alternative would in fact be the slaughter of men and women which the United States was trying to stop.

Foreign Office please repeat to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 34.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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1948

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PALESTINE

3007 148  
28 MAR 1948

Registry Number } E3907/1078/31  
TELEGRAM FROM  
Lord Inverchapel  
No. 144 Washington  
Dated 25.3.48  
Received in Registry } 26.3.48

U.S. attitude - Palestine question  
Refers to Washington telegram No. 21st March (E3739/1078/31). Quotes report from "New York Times" of 25th March giving Mr. Marshall's statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 24th March when he said that concern for the success of the aid for Europe plan was a compelling factor in the changed policy of the U.S. on Palestine.  
Repeated to Jerusalem and New York.

Last Paper.  
E 3900

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.) (Index)  
Gellie  
[Signature]

Next Paper.  
E 3914

(Minutes.)  
Mr Beelen  
N.A. Dep. P. 14.  
S.L. Dep. C. 94  
H.S. Beelen  
Mar. 27  
H. Beelen 27/3  
SAB  
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En Clair

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POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

26 MAR 1948  
FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel

No. 1443  
25th March, 1948.

D. 7.20 p.m. 25th March, 1948.  
R. 2.5 a.m. 26th March, 1948.

Repeated to Jerusalem

New York (U.K. Del.) Saving

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1443 of  
March 25th repeated to Jerusalem (via Foreign Office) and  
Saving to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

My telegram No. 1351. *3724/375/31*

According to a report in New York Times of 25th March  
Mr. Marshall is said to have told the Senate Foreign  
Relations Committee, on the previous day, that concern  
for the success of the whole programme for aid to Europe  
was a compelling factor in the changed policy of the  
United States on Palestine.

2. The Committee was extremely reticent on what had  
passed the report continued but "informants of the  
utmost reliability" said that Mr. Marshall made the follow-  
ing points

(a) the United States had originally taken the  
lead over partition in the belief that the two communities  
in Palestine would ultimately accommodate themselves to the  
new situation without too much outside pressure

(b) This had proved incorrect and when it  
became clear that implementation would require heavy military  
forces possibly for a long period the United States had  
felt compelled to reconsider its attitude.

(c) Implementation through the United Nations  
would make very probable the use in and round Palestine  
of large bodies of Russian troops.

(d) The world's experience had been that when  
Soviet forces went into an area they tended to stay. The  
maintenance of such a force in Palestine would press  
heavily on Greece and Turkey as well as upon the Arabian  
oil fields which are officially held essential to the  
United States, and to the entire European Recovery  
Programme.

(e) Such a situation might greatly lessen the  
security of the Western democracies in the Mediterranean  
and could, from the political point of view, turn the  
Mediterranean flank against E.R.P.

/(f) After much reconsideration

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(f) After much reconsideration it was felt that in view of this complex situation there was nothing for the United States to do but to go back to the United Nations and, in effect, reverse its earlier position.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 35.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office Telegraph Section for retransmission to Jerusalem]

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1948  
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 E3914 110781 <sup>31/6</sup>  
 Lord Sverdrup  
 Washington  
 1469  
 Top Secret  
 Dated 26 March

PALESTINE  
 EASTERN

E3914 /G  
 27 MAR 1948

151

Palestine: U.S. draft trusteeship agreement

Last Paper.  
 E3883

References.  
 E3926/109819

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)  
 E.W. 2/4

(Index.)  
 W.P.

Next Paper.

(Minutes.)

D. Balfour 38/3  
 RB-107 1/2

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DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel,  
No. 1469.

D. 3.50. p.m. 26th March  
1948.

26th March 1948.

R. 10.40. p.m. 26th March  
1948.

Repeated to U.K. Del. New York,  
Jerusalem.

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1469 of  
March 26th repeated for information to U.K. Del. New York  
and Jerusalem.

Your telegram No. 3381.

Palestine.

When Balfour visited Henderson this morning to convey message contained in Foreign Office telegram under reference, Henderson at once produced two tentative drafts for a trusteeship agreement prepared by his subordinates, which provide respectively for a three-power and a United Nations trusteeship. These drafts are being forwarded to Wright by today's bag under cover of a letter which explains their status. In handing them to Balfour who did no more than undertake to transmit them to London, Henderson stressed the need for early action of some kind if chaos was to be avoided.

2. After expressing appreciation of your message, Henderson said that the main concern of the President and his advisers at this time was to secure a truce in Palestine. This was an essential preliminary to any further progress. Although he made no direct request in the matter, he told Balfour that the United States Government were therefore not unhopeful that it might prove possible for both His Majesty's Government and the United States Government to issue a very early appeal to both communities in Palestine for this purpose. Henderson remarked that he himself was rather less optimistic than some others about the effectiveness of such an appeal in

/present circumstances,

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END.

Washington telegram No. 1469 to Foreign Office

-2-

present circumstances, because he felt that neither community would be willing to commit itself so long as the nature of the eventual political solution in Palestine remained in doubt.

3. Henderson then touched upon the statement made by the President yesterday which represented, he said, no (repeat no) further shift in United States policy. After reminding Balfour that forty percent of democratic party funds came from Jewish sources, Henderson said that while the President himself still personally favoured partition (my telegram No. 1440, paragraph two), he was not (repeat not) going to exercise his influence to bring that particular solution into effect, in spite of the unprecedented pressure to which he was being subjected by Congressmen and others. The position remained as stated by Mr. Truman, namely that a temporary trusteeship was now proposed and that this was not intended to prejudice the eventual political solution which might be achieved.

Foreign Office please repeat to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 36.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem.]

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